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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation consists of three essays, each of which closely relates to epistemic 
norms for rational doxastic states. The central issue is whether epistemic rationality is 
impermissive or not: For any total evidence E, is there a unique doxastic state that any 
possible agent with that total evidence E should take (Uniqueness), or not 
(Permissivism)? 
“Conservatism and Uniqueness”: Conservatism is the idea that an agent’s beliefs 
should be stable as far as possible when she undergoes a learning experience. Uniqueness 
is the idea that any given body of total evidence uniquely determines what it is rational to 
believe. Epistemic Impartiality is the idea that you should not give special treatment to 
your beliefs solely because they are yours. I construe Epistemic Impartiality as a meta-
principle governing epistemic norms, and argue that it is compatible with Conservatism. 
Then I show that if Epistemic Impartiality is correct, Conservatism and Uniqueness go 
together; each implies the other. 
“Cognitive Decision Theory and Permissive Rationality”: In recent epistemology, 
philosophers have deployed a decision theoretic approach to justify various epistemic 
norms. A family of such accounts is known as Cognitive Decision Theory. According to 
Cognitive Decision Theory, rational beliefs are those with maximum expected epistemic 
value. How does Cognitive Decision Theory relate to the debate over permissive 
rationality? As one way of addressing this question, I present and assess an argument 
against Cognitive Decision Theory.  
“Steadfastness, Deference, and Permissive Rationality”: Recently, Benjamin 
Levinstein has offered two interesting arguments concerning epistemic norms and 
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epistemic peer disagreement. In his first argument, Levinstein claims that a tension 
between Permissivism and steadfast attitudes in the face of epistemic peer disagreement 
generally leads us to conciliatory attitudes; in his second argument, he argues that, given 
an ‘extremely weak version of a deference principle,’ Permissivism collapses into 
Uniqueness. However, in this chapter, I show that both arguments fail. This result 
supports the following claim: we should treat steadfast attitudes and at least some 
versions of a deference principle as viable positions in the discussion about several types 
of Permissivism, because they are compatible with any type of Permissivism.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
 
 
DEDICATION 
To Chanse Jung and Jinsook Kim 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
Above all I wish to thank my advisor, Brad Armendt, and my other committee members, 
Douglas Portmore, and Ángel Pinillos, for their helpful comments and suggestions on 
earlier drafts of this dissertation. I am also very grateful to Ilho Park for all his help on 
this dissertation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................ vii 
LIST OF FIGURES ......................................................................................................... viii 
CHAPTER 
1           INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................1 
2           CONSERVATISM AND UNIQUENESS ..................................................6 
                         Introduction .....................................................................................6 
                         Uniqueness and Permissivism.......................................................12 
                         Epistemic Impartiality ...................................................................15 
                         Conservatism and Epistemic Impartiality .....................................21 
                         Conservatism and Uniqueness ......................................................27 
                         Conclusion ....................................................................................31 
3           COGNITIVE DECISION THEORY AND PERMISSIVE 
RATIONALITY .......................................................................................33 
                         Introduction ...................................................................................33 
                         Cognitive Decision Theory ...........................................................35 
                         Two General Norms for Cognitive Decision Theory ...................39 
                         Argument against Cognitive Decision Theory .............................42 
                         Responses ......................................................................................45 
                         Conclusion ....................................................................................59 
4           STEADFASTNESS, DEFERENCE, AND PERMISSIVE 
 RATIONALITY .......................................................................................61 
vi 
 
 
 
CHAPTER                                                                                                                      Page 
                            Introduction ................................................................................61 
                            Permissivism and Uniqueness....................................................63 
                            Levinstein’s First Argument and Responses..............................65 
                            Levinstein’s Second Argument and Responses .........................79 
                            Conclusion .................................................................................85 
5           CONCLUSION .........................................................................................86 
REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................88 
APPENDIX 
A         JEFFREY CONDITIONALIZATION, WPE, AND PERMISSIVISM ................92 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vii 
 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table               Page 
1. Comparison between Permissivism1, Permissivism2, Permissivism3, and 
Uniqueness I...........................................................................................................15 
2. Comparison between Permissivism1, Permissivism2, Permissivism3, and 
Uniqueness II .........................................................................................................54 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
viii 
 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure               Page 
1. Comparison between Paul’s Doxastic History and John’s Doxastic History I ......10 
2. Comparison between Paul’s Doxastic History and John’s Doxastic History II ....55 
3. Comparison between Cody’s Doxastic History and Luke’s Doxastic History ......57 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
We are often faced with uncertainty about various issues from the nature of knowledge 
and the existence of the multiverse to the winner of the 2016 U.S. presidential election. 
One of the central issues in recent epistemology is whether epistemic rationality is 
permissive or not. Some philosophers, who endorse what I call Uniqueness, claim that for 
any total evidence E, there is a unique doxastic state that every possible agent with that 
total evidence E should take. Other philosophers, who endorse what I call Permissivism, 
claim that for some total evidence E, there are multiple doxastic states, any one of which 
a possible agent with that total evidence E can rationally take. This issue is closely related 
with the following general questions:  
 
• We can make a distinction between interpersonal and intrapersonal versions of 
Uniqueness (and similarly for Permissivism): Interpersonal versions apply to 
different individuals; Intrapersonal versions apply to an individual’s selves at 
different times (time-slices of an individual, if you like). What important 
connections are there between these versions, and how do intrapersonal versions 
of Uniqueness (and similarly for Permissivism) relate to rational learning, or 
belief updating? 
• Standard decision theory says that a rational action to perform is one with the 
greatest expected practical value. Recently, many philosophers have deployed a 
decision theoretic approach to justify various epistemic norms. A family of such 
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accounts has recently been called Cognitive Decision Theory. A rational belief, 
according to Cognitive Decision Theory, is one with maximum expected 
epistemic value―one such that your expected epistemic value for how states of 
the world will turn out, given your adopting it, is at least as high as that of any 
alternative doxastic state you might adopt. Can such an approach justify 
Uniqueness (or Permissivism)? Or, are some versions of Uniqueness (or 
Permissivism) among the fundamental epistemic norms that cognitive decision 
theorists implicitly assume? 
• One may find herself faced with other people who share her total evidence and 
cognitive abilities, but have beliefs that conflict with hers. The debate over 
Uniqueness (and Permissivism) is closely related to the debate over the 
significance of such an epistemic peer disagreement. Is disagreement among 
epistemic peers rational? If so, how should we respond to it? 
 
This dissertation centers on some aspects of those questions. It mainly consists of three 
essays, each of which forms a chapter of the dissertation: “Conservatism and 
Uniqueness” (chapter 1); “Cognitive Decision Theory and Permissive Rationality” 
(chapter 2); “Steadfastness, Deference, and Permissive Rationality” (chapter 3). It closes 
with a conclusion that looks toward further work (chapter 4).  
In “Conservatism and Uniqueness,” I address the following question: 
Conservatism is the idea that one’s doxastic states should remain the same, absent any 
new relevant evidence. Epistemic Impartiality is the idea that for purposes of epistemic 
evaluation, there is no significant difference between intrapersonal and interpersonal 
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rationality requirements. When we understand the connections between interpersonal and 
intrapersonal versions of Uniqueness (and similarly for Permissivism) in a way that fits 
Epistemic Impartiality, what is the logical relation between Uniqueness and 
Conservatism? I prove that Conservatism and Uniqueness are logically equivalent. A 
possible objection is that Conservatism appears to be in tension with Epistemic 
Impartiality. That is, in consideration of various motivations for Conservatism, 
Conservatism appears to endorse a form of epistemic partiality towards one’s own 
previous doxastic state. However, I construe Epistemic Impartiality as a meta-principle 
governing epistemic norms, and argue that the version of the conservative idea that I have 
in mind fits naturally with Epistemic Impartiality, and that it is philosophically interesting 
to consider Conservatism on the assumption of Epistemic Impartiality.  
In “Cognitive Decision Theory and Permissive Rationality,” I address the 
following question: How does Cognitive Decision Theory relate to the debate over 
Permissivism and Uniqueness? As one way of addressing this question, I present and 
assess an argument against Cognitive Decision Theory: On the assumption of 
Conservatism, the correct theory of epistemic rationality will not endorse non-
conservative doxastic state shifts from one degree of belief function to another, in the 
absence of new evidence. There are general norms that dictate how epistemic utilities 
constrain the set of rational doxastic states, one of which is Epistemic Immodesty: A 
doxastic state should rank itself at least as highly as it ranks any other possible doxastic 
state. We can distinguish strict immodesty from non-strict immodesty in the following 
way:  
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Strict Immodesty: If a rational agent’s current degree of belief function is c, then 
the agent should take her own degree of belief function c to uniquely maximize 
expected epistemic utility from the perspective of c. 
Non-Strict Immodesty: If a rational agent’s current degree of belief function is c, 
then the agent should take her own degree of belief function c to be one of the 
possible degree of belief functions that maximize expected epistemic utility from 
the perspective of c. 
 
In some possible cases in which Non-Strict Immodesty holds, Cognitive Decision Theory 
endorses non-conservative doxastic state shifts, in the absence of new evidence. This 
seems to be an unfortunate consequence. However, I will further show that when we 
clearly distinguish among several versions of Permissivism/Uniqueness, the argument is 
not a real threat to any cognitive decision theorist. Depending on which version of 
Permissivism/Uniqueness a cognitive decision theorist endorses, they may avoid the 
argument in one of two general ways. One response appeals to the stability of beliefs over 
time, while the other allows the instability of beliefs over time to fit naturally with 
epistemic rationality. 
In “Steadfastness, Deference, and Permissive Rationality,” I address the following 
question: Steadfastness is the idea that for some total evidence E, if two or more 
maximally rational agents who share that total evidence E have different doxastic states, 
they can rationally retain their own doxastic states regardless of what other’s doxastic 
states turn out to be. Deference is the idea that if one knows that her initial doxastic state 
is not maximally rational, she should defer to any doxastic states that she thinks may be 
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maximally rational. Those are epistemic norms that could be applied to epistemic peer 
disagreement. How do Steadfastness and Deference relate to Permissivism and 
Uniqueness? As one way of addressing this question, I present and assess Benjamin 
Levinstein’s two recent interesting arguments concerning the issue. In his first argument, 
Levinstein claims that a tension between Permissivism and Steadfastness in the face of 
epistemic peer disagreement generally leads us to conciliatory attitudes; in his second 
argument, he argues that, given an ‘extremely weak version of a deference principle,’ 
Permissivism collapses into Uniqueness. However, in this chapter, I show that both 
arguments fail. When we clearly distinguish among several types of Permissivism, we 
can see that Permissivism fits well with Steadfastness, and that, even on the assumption 
of the ‘extremely weak version of a deference principle,’ Permissivism does not collapse 
into Uniqueness. This result supports the following claim: we should treat Steadfastness 
and at least some versions of a deference principle as viable positions in the discussion 
about several types of Permissivism, because they are compatible with any type of 
Permissivism.  
Let us now consider how various epistemic norms relate to the debate over 
permissive rationality in detail. 
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CHAPTER 2 
CONSERVATISM AND UNIQUENESS 
1 Introduction  
In typical Bayesian fashion, let credences be an agent’s belief strengths in propositions.1 
Throughout, I will assume that (CF) an agent’s overall doxastic state at time ti can be 
represented as a credence function that maps any proposition X to a real number from 0 to 
1; (DS) each distinct credence function represents a distinct doxastic state; all credence 
functions are probabilistically coherent. Now let us consider how to update credences 
after a learning experience. 
Sometimes one’s credence in a proposition is directly changed after a learning 
experience. To illustrate, suppose you newly learn with certainty that (E) the murder 
suspect, Sophie, has left her fingerprints on the dead body, and nothing else. Then your 
credence in E is directly updated to be 1.2  
Sometimes one’s credence in a proposition is indirectly changed after a learning 
experience. For example, given that you newly learn E and nothing else, and that you 
know that E is evidentially relevant to the claim that (K) Sophie is the killer, your 
credence in K is updated accordingly.  
                                                           
1 In this paper, I will focus on credences (or credal states) instead of beliefs (or belief states). However, I 
think that the main point (that, on the assumption of Impartiality, Conservatism is equivalent to 
Uniqueness) applies to a simple model of all-or-nothing beliefs (given an arbitrary proposition X, an agent 
believes, disbelieves, or withholds beliefs in X) as well. 
 
2 For my purposes here, we do not need to assume credence functions are regular (strictly coherent). And 
we will restrict our discussion to an idealized context where forgetting is not a factor. 
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But sometimes one’s credence in a proposition should be unchanged even after a 
learning experience. For example, suppose that the learning experience directly changes 
your credence in E from 0.2 to 1.0 and nothing else. Then how should you indirectly 
change your credence in the proposition that (H) the number of trees in the Antarctic is 
even, after the learning experience? It is very intuitive in such cases to say: your credence 
in H should remain the same after the learning experience. On this way of thinking, the 
following principle seems to be assumed.  
 
Credal Conservatism: When a rational agent undergoes a learning experience, E, 
between ti and tj, her credence in a proposition that is irrelevant to E should 
remain the same between ti and tj3, and when a rational agent undergoes no 
learning experience between ti and tj, her credence in any proposition should 
remain the same between ti and tj (ti < tj).4 
 
I call this ‘Credal Conservatism’ (‘Conservatism’ for short), because it implies that you 
are obliged to have conservative doxastic attitudes to a proposition that is irrelevant to 
your learning experience, and to any proposition when you undergo no learning 
experience.5  
                                                           
3 E is a proposition that captures all that the agent learns between ti and tj.   
 
4 Regarding the first conjunct of Conservatism, I basically follow Park (ms). (But Park does not suggest the 
second conjunct.) 
5 The conservative idea about doxastic attitudes is not new; it has been suggested by a number of 
philosophers.  For example, see Christensen (1994), Foley (1982), Harman (1986), Quine (1951), and Sklar 
(1975). Note that there are a number of different versions of Conservatism. For instance, the strongest 
version of Conservatism implies that whatever an agent happens to believe, it is rational for her to retain it. 
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Conservatism seems to fit naturally with the claim that, in some evidential 
situations, there are multiple permissible credal states. To illustrate, let’s consider the 
following case from Meacham (2014) in which one seems to be required to have a 
permissive view on credal states: 
 
“Consider an agent who has just been created tabula rasa. Consider her initial 
belief state. At first glance, it’s implausible to think that there’s a single doxastic 
state that she should be rationally required to have. It’s hard to see how rationality 
could require her to have a particular credence in (say) the proposition that there 
are several thousand chickens nearby. After all, what would this unique rational 
credence be? 0.7? 0.1? Given no evidence and no background beliefs to appeal to, 
how could one think that her credence is rationally required to take any one of 
these values?” (Meacham 2014: 1190; italics and parentheses in original)  
 
Many deny that in such an evidential situation there is a unique doxastic state the agent 
should take.6 On this way of thinking, the following principle seems to be assumed.  
 
Permissivism: For some evidence E, there are multiple credal states, any one of 
which a possible agent with total evidence E can rationally take. 
 
                                                           
As we can clearly see, the version of Conservatism that I examine in this paper is much weaker than the 
strongest versions. 
  
6 For instance, many subjective Bayesians are among them.  
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Many seem to think that Conservatism is compatible with Permissivism. Roger White, 
for instance, expresses the point particularly clearly:  
 
“Proponents of Conservatism ... suggest that you are prima facie justified in 
maintaining your beliefs until you have a reason to abandon them. So had you 
drawn a different conclusion from the same evidence, you would be fully rational 
in continuing to hold it, at least until challenged.”7 
 
Lawrence Sklar makes a similar point: 
 
“If you believe some proposition, on the basis of whatever positive warrant may 
accrue to it from the evidence, a priori plausibility, and so forth, it is unreasonable 
to cease to believe the proposition to be true merely because of the existence of, 
or knowledge of the existence of, alternative incompatible hypotheses whose 
positive warrant is no greater than that of the proposition already believed.”8 
 
These authors seem to agree that one’s total evidence can make it rational to have one of 
many permissible credal states and that someone with that total evidence can update her 
credences in accordance with Conservatism. 
If ‘an agent’ in Permissivism ranges only over (possible) individuals, 
Conservatism is definitely compatible with Permissivism. To illustrate, suppose that there 
                                                           
7 White (2005: 445). 
 
8 Sklar (1975: 378). 
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is an evidential situation (say total evidence E) in which there are two permissible 
doxastic states, D1 and D2 (D1 ≠ D2), at time t. Let’s assume that in such a situation, two 
rational agents, called Paul and John, have D1 and D2, respectively, and undergo no 
learning experience between t1 and t2. Let’s also assume that Conservatism holds here. 
Then, we can lay out Paul’s doxastic history and John’s between t1 and t2, respectively, as 
follows: 
 
Figure 1  
Comparison between Paul’s doxastic history and John’s doxastic history I 
Paul’s doxastic history between t1 and t2 
…………….. D1…………. at time t2          (Only D1 is permissible for Paul.)  
  
                        ↑                                        
  
…………….. D1…………...at time t1      (D1 and D2 are permissible for Paul.)        
                        
 
John’s doxastic history between t1 and t2 
…………….. D2………… at time t2      (Only D2 is permissible for John.)   
  
                       ↑                                        
  
…………….. D2……..….. at time t1      (D1 and D2 are permissible for John.) 
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 In the case under consideration, Conservatism is clearly compatible with Permissivism. 
At each time, for the total evidence E, there are two permissible doxastic states (D1 and 
D2), one of which Paul (and John) could rationally take, and both Paul and John satisfy 
Conservatism between t1 and t2.9  
However, what if ‘an agent’ in Permissivism ranges also over an agent’s selves at 
different times (time-slices of agents, if you like)? To put it another way, if, in 
determining what credences one ought to have for purposes of epistemic evaluation there 
is no significant difference between intrapersonal and interpersonal rationality 
requirements (see ‘Epistemic Impartiality’ below), is Conservatism still compatible with 
Permissivism? In the following sections, I will argue that on such an assumption, 
Conservatism is equivalent to the denial of Permissivism, and thus is incompatible with 
Permissivism. Some may think that it appears from the outset that Conservatism is in 
tension with the claim that there is no such significant difference between intrapersonal 
and interpersonal rationality requirements: The conservatives seem to give a certain kind 
of epistemic privilege to some intrapersonal rationality requirements. However, I will 
discuss the principles of Epistemic Impartiality and Conservatism, and argue that, while 
they may seem to conflict, there are significant, interesting versions of those principles 
that are compatible. 
I will proceed as follows. In section 2, following Meacham (2014), I will suggest 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the denial of Permissivism and clearly define 
Permissivism and its denial in accordance with them. In section 3, I will suggest the 
                                                           
9 Note that even though Paul at t1 (and similarly for John) is permitted to have different doxastic states, Paul 
at t2 is not. At t2, however, Permissivism still holds because two different individuals are permitted to have 
different doxastic states.  
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principle of Epistemic Impartiality and briefly consider its implications and acceptability. 
In section 4, I will consider commitments that seem to motivate the endorsement of 
conservative doxastic attitudes by giving a special weight to one’s own credal states. I 
will show that, even if Epistemic Impartiality appears to be opposed to those 
commitments, the version of the conservative idea that I have in mind fits naturally with 
Epistemic Impartiality, and that it is philosophically interesting to consider Conservatism 
on the assumption of Epistemic Impartiality. In section 5, I will prove that on the 
assumption of Epistemic Impartiality, Conservatism is equivalent to the denial of 
Permissivism. Finally, in section 6, I will conclude with some brief remarks regarding the 
equivalence result. 
Before proceeding further, however, a clarification of the sort of rationality I have 
in mind is in order. As do many philosophers, I think there is a distinction between 
epistemic reasons for believing, which mainly concern truth or accuracy of beliefs as 
representations of the world’s state, and practical reasons for believing, which mainly 
concern practical interests of beliefs as ways to one’s happiness.10 In this paper, the issue 
that puzzles me is not related to whether Conservatism and Permissivism are prudential 
principles for practical interests. My interest is in the logical relation between 
Conservatism and Permissivism, which are interpreted as epistemic principles. 
 
2 Uniqueness and Permissivism 
Let’s call the denial of Permissivism Uniqueness, which can be stated as follows: 
 
                                                           
10 For instance, see Christensen (2000: 351-2), Foley (1982: 170-1), and Joyce (1998: 445). 
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Uniqueness: For any evidence E, there is a unique credal state that any possible 
agent x with total evidence E should take.11 
 
Following Meacham (2014: 1188), we can show that Uniqueness is equivalent to the 
conjunction of the following two claims: 
 
(1) For any possible agent x with total evidence E, there is only one permissible 
credence function for that agent. 
(2) The same credence functions are permissible for all possible agents x who 
share total evidence E.12 
 
To see that the equivalence holds, let me start by proving that Uniqueness implies (1) and 
(2). Assume that Uniqueness holds. Then, (1) follows from our assumption that (CF) 
one’s overall credal state can be represented by a credence function. Furthermore, note 
that Uniqueness requires all possible agents who share total evidence E to take the same 
credal state. Then, (2) also follows from CF.  
                                                           
11 I’m following Feldman (2007), Meacham (2014), and White (2005) in the use of Uniqueness and 
Permissivism. In particular, Uniqueness is what Meacham (2014: 1187) calls Evidential Uniqueness. 
However, note that Meacham applies Evidential Uniqueness only to Bayesians who accept 
Conditionalization or Jeffrey Conditionalization. When applying Uniqueness, we do not have such a 
restriction here.  
 
12 (1) and (2) are basically from what Meacham (2014: 1188) calls Agent Uniqueness and Permission 
Parity, respectively. However, note that regarding Agent Uniqueness and Permission Parity, Meacham 
restricts credence functions to initial credence functions (what he calls priors functions) that only tabula 
rasa agents (or super babies) can take. However, regarding (1) and (2), we do not have such a restriction 
here. (1) and (2) can apply to any credence function that is probabilistically coherent. 
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 Next, we can show that (1) and (2) imply Uniqueness. To see this, assume that (1) 
and (2) hold. Then, it follows that there is only one permissible credence function for all 
possible agents who share total evidence E. Then, Uniqueness follows from our 
assumption that (DS) each distinct credence function represents a distinct credal state.13  
As we have seen, Uniqueness is equivalent to the conjunction of (1) and (2). Thus 
anyone who rejects either (1) or (2) (or both) would accept Permissivism and likely say 
that there are at least some cases where there are multiple permissible credences that 
tabula rasa agents can rationally have in a proposition such as ‘there are several thousand 
chickens nearby.’  
 Now, following Meacham (2014), we can distinguish three types of Permissivism. 
 
(i) Permissivism1: One that rejects both (1) and (2) 
(ii) Permissivism2: One that rejects (1) but accepts (2) 
(iii) Permissivism3: One that accepts (1) but rejects (2) 
 
Table 1 provides illustrations of the differences: Let E be the total evidence that two 
rational agents, called John and Paul, share at time t, and assume that each credence 
function is different from each other. Permissivism1 is illustrated by the case where John 
and Paul have different permissible credence functions (C1 and C2 for John and C3 and C4 
for Paul) and actually have different credence functions (C1 for John and C3 for Paul). 
Permissivism2 is illustrated by the case where John and Paul have the same permissible 
credence functions (C1 and C2 for John and Paul) but actually have different credence 
                                                           
13 Regarding the assumptions, see section 1. 
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functions (C1 for John and C2 for Paul). Permissivism3 is illustrated by the case where 
John and Paul have different credence functions that are uniquely permissible for John 
and Paul, respectively (C1 for John and C2 for Paul). Lastly, in contrast to Permissivism, 
Uniqueness is illustrated by the case where there is a unique credence function (say C1) 
that any agent should take.  
 
Table 1  
Comparison between Permissivism1, Permissivism2, Permissivism3, and Uniqueness I 
 Total Evidence E Total Evidence E 
 John’s actual credence 
function; Permissible 
credence functions for John 
Paul’s actual 
credence function; 
Permissible credence 
functions for Paul 
Permissivism1 C1; C1 and C2 C3; C3 and C4 
Permissivism2 C1; C1 and C2 C2; C1 and C2 
Permissivism3 C1; C1 C2; C2 
Uniqueness C1; C1  C1; C1 
 
3 Epistemic Impartiality 
There is the question of what the variable ‘x’ in (1) and (2) ranges over. Of course, as I 
already mentioned in section 1, it ranges over (possible) agents. The falsehood of (1), for 
instance, is compatible with a possible case in which the agent, Julie, who has just been 
created tabula rasa in France, has credence 0.55 in the proposition that (H) the number of 
trees in the Antarctic is even, and another agent, Ethan, who has also been created tabula 
rasa at the same time in Texas, has credence 0.47 in H. In other words, on the assumption 
16 
 
 
 
of the denial of (1), there is a possible case in which given the same total evidence, two 
agents rationally have different credences, respectively. 
What if ‘x’ ranges over (possible) agents at specific times; time-slices of agents, if 
you like? Consider the following principle:  
 
Epistemic Impartiality1: In determining what credence functions one ought to 
have, for purposes of epistemic evaluation, there is no significant difference 
between intrapersonal and interpersonal rationality requirements.14  
 
To say that there is no significant difference between intrapersonal and interpersonal 
epistemic rationality requirements is to say that for every correct epistemic intrapersonal 
rationality constraint, there is a corresponding correct epistemic interpersonal rationality 
constraint that is just as compelling as the intrapersonal rationality constraint, and vice 
versa. Note that this constraint is a meta-requirement: It constrains the relationship 
between intrapersonal and interpersonal rationality requirements. Thus, more formally, 
the meta-requirement that we have in mind says: 
 
Epistemic Impartiality2: For any epistemic rationality constraint , 
(I) when  holds for distinct individuals, <ia, tk>, …, <in, tm>,   ought to hold for 
your time slices, <iy, tz>, …, <iy, tx>, which evidentially correspond to <ia, tk>, …, 
<in, tm>, respectively;  
                                                           
14 For instance, many take Conservatism, Conditionalization, and Reflection principle to be intrapersonal, 
and Uniqueness and Permissivism to be interpersonal.  
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(II) when  holds for your time-slices, <iy, tz>, …, <iy, tx>,  ought to hold for 
distinct individuals, <ia, tk>, …, <in, tm>, which evidentially correspond to <iy, tz>, 
…, <iy, tx>, respectively. 
(Here, ii and tj refer to an agent and time, respectively.15) 
 
To illustrate, let’s consider the following cases: It follows by Epistemic Impartiality2 that 
if the total evidence E uniquely fixes what the credences of two agents (say John and 
Paul) who share that total evidence E should be, then the same total evidence E would 
also uniquely fix what the credences of one agent’s two selves (say John at t1 and John at 
t2) who share that total evidence E should be, and vice versa.16 Also, it follows by 
Epistemic Impartiality2 that if the total evidence E allows John and Paul, who share the 
same background information to have different credences as a rational response to E, the 
same total evidence E would also allow John at t1 and John at t2, who share the same 
background information to have different credences as a rational response to E, and vice 
versa.17, 18 In other words, when it comes to assessing which credences two time-slice 
                                                           
15 Note that interpersonal relations hold not only for <i1, t1> and <i2, t1> but also for <i1, t1> and <i2, t2> 
where i1 ≠ i2 and t1 ≠ t2.  
16 Here we assume that John does not obtain any more evidence but remains with the same total evidence E 
between t1 and t2. 
 
17 The distinction between interpersonal and intrapersonal versions of Uniqueness (and similarly for 
Permissivism) is not new. For instance, Kelly (2014: 303-7) clearly distinguishes versions of Uniqueness 
that have what he calls interpersonal import from those that lack such import (versions of Uniqueness that 
have only intrapersonal import). Thanks to an anonymous referee for this point.  
 
18 To illustrate Epistemic Impartiality2 further, we can also consider van Fraassen (1984)’s Reflection 
principle, according to which, one’s current self should epistemically defer to one’s future self. Given 
Reflection principle is a correct epistemic intrapersonal rationality constraint, Epistemic Impartiality2 
implies that one’s current self should also epistemically defer to another agent who evidentially 
corresponds to one’s future self. 
18 
 
 
 
agents ought to have, it matters what their evidence is, not whether they are time slices of 
the same agent.19  
Epistemic Impartiality2 assumes that what credences you ought to have at a time 
depends on your total evidence at that time. One might think, however, that what 
credences you ought to have at a time depends on both your evidence and your own 
epistemic standards at that time. The thought is that there are various epistemic values 
such as accuracy, verisimilitude, informativeness, explanatoriness, simplicity, etc. that 
sometimes conflict each other, and in assessing your rational credences, you must depend 
not only on your total evidence but also on your way of weighing epistemic values 
against each other. That is, when we do epistemic evaluations of an agent’s doxastic 
states, we should consider not only her total evidence, but how she weighs epistemic 
values. To illustrate, suppose that you have an epistemic standard that weighs accuracy 
more than informativeness. And, suppose further that your friend, Josh, has a different 
epistemic standard that weighs informativeness more than accuracy. Then, according to 
the view, for some proposition P, it is permissible for you to have a high credence in P 
and for Josh to have a low credence in P, because you and Josh have different epistemic 
standards. Is this view compatible with Epistemic Impartiality? Epistemic Impartiality2 
says nothing about this question, but I think the answer is yes: Let ‘x epistemically 
corresponds to y at a time’ mean that ‘x and y share both total evidence and epistemic 
                                                           
19 Does Epistemic Impartiality consider only time-slices residing in our actual world, or in other possible 
worlds too? Since Epistemic Impartiality is a meta-principle, the answer is given by the first-order 
epistemic principles to which it applies. If the scope of a first-order interpersonal principle includes non-
actual agents, Epistemic Impartiality demands that the scope of the corresponding intrapersonal principle 
does as well, and vice versa. 
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standard(s) at that time.’ Then the version of Epistemic Impartiality that is compatible 
with the view can be stated as follows: 
 
Epistemic Impartiality3: For any epistemic rationality constraint , 
(I’) when  holds for distinct individuals, <ia, tk>, …, <in, tm>,  ought to hold for 
your time slices, <iy, tz>, …, <iy, tx>, which epistemically correspond to <ia, tk>, 
…, <in, tm>, respectively;  
(II’) when  holds for your time-slices, <iy, tz>, …, <iy, tx>,  ought to hold for 
distinct individuals, <ia, tk>, …, <in, tm>, which epistemically correspond to <iy, 
tz>, …, <iy, tx>, respectively. 
 
To illustrate, suppose that you have total evidence E and epistemic standard(s) ES I at t1, 
both of which a different agent, Lesley at t2, shares with you. Suppose further that you 
learn nothing but you change your epistemic standard(s) from ES I to ES II between t1 
and t2 while Lesley does not. Then, on the assumption of Epistemic Impartiality3, if the 
total evidence E allows Lesley at t2 and you at t2, who have different epistemic 
standard(s), ES I and ES II, respectively, to have different credences as a rational 
response to E, then the same total evidence E would also allow you at t1 and you at t2, 
who have different epistemic standard(s), ES I and ES II, respectively, to have different 
credences as a rational response to E, and vice versa.20 
                                                           
20 It is noteworthy that, on the precise credence model that says an agent’s overall doxastic state at time ti 
should be represented as a single credence function at ti, if there is no epistemically privileged unique 
epistemic standard, this view is incompatible with Conservatism and Uniqueness because, on the proposed 
view, two distinct time-slices with the same total evidence but different epistemic standards can have 
different credences. 
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Are there multiple permissible epistemic standards?; Do different epistemic 
standards sometimes warrant different ways of weighing epistemic values? If so, we 
should take Epistemic Impartiality3 rather than Epistemic Impartiality2 to make that point 
clearly; if not, we may keep Epistemic Impartiality2 rather than Epistemic Impartiality3. 
Which way should we go? In order to answer that question, we would need to give an 
account of the range of legitimate epistemic standards, something I do not have space 
here to address. But it is noteworthy that, even on the assumption of Epistemic 
Impartiality3, we can easily prove that Permissivism is equivalent to the denial of 
Conservatism, as will be shown in section 5. Thus the main point of this paper (given 
Epistemic Impartiality, Conservatism is equivalent to Uniqueness) still holds, even on the 
assumption of Epistemic Impartiality3. For simplicity, let us henceforth focus on 
Epistemic Impartiality2 (Impartiality for short) rather than Epistemic Impartiality3.  
The general idea of impartiality concerning doxastic attitudes is not new.21 In 
particular, Hedden (2015) and Moss (2015) accept “time-slice rationality” (what Moss 
calls “time-slice epistemology”) that is committed to the following two constraints: 
 
Synchronicity: All rationality requirements are synchronic. 
Impartiality: There is no significant difference between intrapersonal and 
interpersonal rationality requirements.    
 
The Impartiality that I have in mind (Epistemic Impartiality2) does not imply 
Synchronicity. To see this, note that Impartiality is a meta-requirement: It constrains the 
                                                           
21 For instance, see Christensen (1991, 2000), Hedden (2015), and Moss (2015). 
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relationship between intrapersonal and interpersonal rationality requirements. Thus, when 
C is a diachronic intrapersonal rationality requirement, Impartiality implies that there 
should be an interpersonal counterpart of C, which is as compelling as C. Note that 
Impartiality itself does not pass judgment on whether C or its interpersonal counterpart is 
a rationality requirement. 
Why accept Impartiality? Christensen (2000: 370-1) suggests that the epistemic 
goal of accuracy provides a reason: 
  
“The appeal of Epistemic Impartiality lies in the objectivity of truth. Epistemic 
rationality aims most fundamentally at accurate representation of the world. This 
is an objective matter, bearing no intrinsic relation to the matter of which beliefs 
have belonged, or will in the future belong, to the agent.” 
 
It is worth investigating in detail how well accuracy justifies Impartiality, but that would 
go beyond the scope of this paper. For my purposes here, it is enough to assume 
Impartiality rather than to defend it. Assuming Impartiality, we can say that the variable 
‘x’ in Uniqueness conditions (1) and (2) ranges over at least ordered pairs <ii, tj> where ii 
and tj refer to an agent and time, respectively. 
 
4 Conservatism and Epistemic Impartiality 
Is it philosophically interesting to consider Conservatism in conjunction with 
Impartiality? Some may think it is not because Conservatism appears to be in tension 
with Impartiality. In this section, I will respond to such a view: I will show that there is a 
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motivation for Conservatism that fits naturally with Epistemic Impartiality, and provide a 
case that, I think, shows that even in the presence of Impartiality, Conservatism is still an 
interesting epistemic principle. 
According to Conservatism, an agent is to some extent justified in maintaining 
credences in virtue of the fact that she has those credences, given no relevant changes in 
her total evidence. But how could the fact that the agent has some credences in some 
measure justify her in continuing to have those credences? Some philosophers who 
endorse a strong dogmatic motivation for Conservatism may assert that, at least in some 
cases such as the stage of forming initial credences, when you happen to have some 
initial credences, that is all the justification you need for continuing to have them. Other 
philosophers who endorse a pragmatic (or energy-saving) motivation for Conservatism 
might assert that, other things being equal, the conservative doxastic attitude is beneficial 
from a pragmatic perspective because changing one’s credal states is an energy 
consuming process.22 Still other philosophers who endorse a learning-preserving (or 
evidence-preserving) motivation for Conservatism might assert that when your credences 
properly reflect what you have learned (or your evidence as it accumulates), in the 
absence of relevant changes in your evidence, the conservative doxastic attitude is 
required so as to preserve your learning.23  
Now, I do not have space here to give a full account of how to motivate 
Conservatism, but I think that we can safely say that commitments that motivate the 
endorsement of Conservatism are commitments that lead an agent to give special 
                                                           
22 See Sklar (1975). 
 
23 See Harman (1986). 
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treatment to her own (previous) credal state. That is, in consideration of various 
motivations for Conservatism, Conservatism appears to endorse a form of epistemic 
partiality towards one’s own previous credal state. Thus Impartiality appears to be in 
tension with these motivations behind Conservatism because Impartiality implies that the 
fact that some credal states are yours has no independent epistemic significance.24 
Impartiality is indeed opposed to some motivations for Conservatism. For 
instance, according to the strong dogmatic motivation for Conservatism, the 
consideration determining which credal states an agent would adopt gives special status 
to her own previous credences simply because they were hers in the past. This is of course 
incompatible with Impartiality.  
What about the ‘energy-saving’ motivation? The ‘energy-saving’ motivation 
assumes that once a credence has become established, more cognitive effort would be 
required to get rid of it and then adopt a new one, than would be required just to retain it. 
Thus the ‘energy-saving’ motivation is in tension with Impartiality. To illustrate, suppose 
that there is another (possible) agent, Jim, who evidentially corresponds to your time-
slice at t1, and that you learn nothing between t1 and t2. Suppose further that at t2 adopting 
Jim’s credences is less energy efficient than retaining your own credences from t1. Then, 
given the ‘energy-saving’ motivation, even if there is another (possible) agent like Jim, 
this consideration for determining which credal states you should adopt gives special 
                                                           
24 Note that, according to Impartiality, all intrapersonal epistemic requirements can be derived from 
principles which apply equally in the interpersonal case. 
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status to your own previous credences at t1 simply in order to promote your practical 
interest in energy-saving. This is of course incompatible with (Epistemic) Impartiality.25 
But more moderate motivations for Conservatism need not conflict with 
Impartiality. To see this, let us consider the learning-preserving motivation for 
Conservatism. According to the learning-preserving motivation, in the absence of 
relevant changes in evidence, when credences properly reflect what an agent, Jane, has 
learned (or her evidence as it accumulates), the consideration determining which 
credences Jane would adopt gives special status to her own previous credences not simply 
due to the fact that she had those credences, but to the fact that her credences themselves 
are her repository of past learning.26 Thus, on the assumption of such a moderate 
motivation, if there is another (possible) agent, David, whose credences also reflect what 
Jane has learned (or her total evidence) as properly as Jane’s credences do, it would be 
natural that the consideration determining which credences Jane would adopt gives 
special status not only to her own previous credences but also to David’s credences.27 
                                                           
25 Is ‘energy-saving’ a good motivation for a variety of Conservatism that is interpreted as an epistemic 
principle? I think that a necessary condition for a good motivation for Conservatism is that it provides a 
good epistemic reason for it. The ‘energy-saving’ motivation, however, directly provides only a practical 
reason to agents like us who have a limited amount of cognitive power. The ‘energy-saving’ motivation 
might indirectly provide an epistemic reason for Conservatism as follows: conservatives would have more 
energy left to pursue truths, and thus would end up believing more truths or achieving better accuracy. (See 
Christensen (1994: 86) for this point.) Of course, it can indirectly provide an epistemic reason for 
Conservatism only if an agent’s belief-forming process is reliable. When an agent’s belief-forming process 
is unreliable, even if she keeps the conservative doxastic attitudes and has more cognitive energy left to 
pursue truths, she could end up believing more falsehoods or achieving less accuracy. 
 
26 In contrast to the ‘energy-saving’ motivation, I think, the ‘learning-preservation’ motivation directly 
provides a good epistemic reason for conservatism, given that an agent’s credences properly reflect what 
the agent has learned.  
 
27 We can regard David as Jane’s epistemic peer who is as reliable as Jane is and shares total evidence with 
Jane at relevant time. The point is that, the learning-preserving considerations endorse credences that 
capture what Jane has learned, whether they are encapsulated by her past credences or by David’s 
credences. 
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Note that when there is no such an agent like David, even if the consideration singles out 
only Jane’s previous credences, it would not violate Impartiality. That is, if your 
consideration relies on the only resource available to you, this constitutes no violation of 
Impartiality as long as there is no point at which the consideration discriminates between 
credal states solely on the basis of the fact that some credal state is yours.28 In such a 
case, I think, the learning-preserving motivation for Conservatism is still plausible, and, 
thus we can say that there are at least some acceptable versions of Conservatism that fit 
naturally with Impartiality. 
To make that point more clear, let us consider a particular version of the learning 
preservation motivation drawn from the problem of the forgotten evidence.29 To 
illustrate, suppose that you have a high credence in that (M) Marlon Brando was born in 
Omaha, Nebraska. Suppose further that, as we often fail to keep track of the evidence 
upon which our credences are based, you cannot now remember your evidence upon 
which your credence in M is based. (You just know that you underwent some reliable 
learning experience regarding M.) In this case, it is epistemically rational to maintain 
your credence in M even though you forget the evidence, and Conservatism seems to be 
required to explain this. Now one might claim that such a particular version of ‘learning-
preservation’ motivation is incompatible with Impartiality: What credence in M you 
ought to have depends (in part) on your forgotten evidence regarding M, which your 
credence in M properly reflects, and this seems to require giving a certain kind of 
                                                           
28 See Christensen (2000: 368) for similar points.  
 
29 In this paper, as mentioned in footnote 2, we restrict our discussion to an idealized context where 
forgetting is not a factor. To illustrate the ‘learning-preservation’ motivation more clearly, however, let us 
here consider that particular version motivated by the problem of the forgotten evidence.  
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epistemic privilege to your credence in M because it is yours. However, as I already 
pointed out, when there are no other agents whose credences also properly reflect your 
forgotten evidence regarding M, even if the consideration determining which credences 
you would adopt singles out only your own previous credence in M, it would not violate 
Impartiality. If your consideration relies on the only resource available to you, this 
constitutes no violation of Impartiality, given that there is no discrimination between 
credences solely on the basis of the fact that some credence is yours. 
The Conservatism I address in this paper is grounded in such a learning-
preserving motivation. Hence even in the presence of Impartiality, I think, Conservatism 
is still an interesting epistemic principle.30 To illustrate this, consider the following case: 
 
Suppose that you are an astrophysicist, and have of course a fairly extensive body 
of beliefs about the multiverse to which you do not give any special status just 
because they are yours. (Your epistemic considerations satisfy Impartiality.) At a 
party, you meet another astrophysicist, Bob, whose beliefs about the multiverse 
you have had reason to think are just as well informed as yours are. (And suppose 
further that, in fact, his credences are just as well informed as yours are.) Thus, as 
a rational agent who has impartial epistemic attitudes, you put Bob’s beliefs on a 
par with yours, because it is epistemically irrelevant whose beliefs you are trying 
to take epistemic advantage of. Although you of course believe that Bob shares 
                                                           
30 For those who hold the strong dogmatic motivation for Conservatism, it might not be philosophically 
interesting to consider Conservatism in conjunction with Impartiality because, on the proposed version, 
Conservatism cannot capture the partial features that, according to them, have the independent epistemic 
significance. But I do not share the strong dogmatic view. 
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the vast majority of your beliefs about the multiverse and do not have any reason 
to suspect that your beliefs are defective, you think that there can be some 
propositions about the multiverse about which you and Bob disagree. However, 
you do not know which of your beliefs are contradicted by his beliefs, and do not 
want to trouble him by asking a lot of work-related questions. Fortunately, you 
have a belief-downloader, which works as follows: If you turn it on, it scans both 
your brain and his, until it finds some proposition(s) about which you and Bob 
disagree. When there is such a proposition, it then replaces your belief with that of 
Bob, and then stops.31  
 
Should you turn on the downloader? In the absence of reasons for thinking your previous 
beliefs to be defective, and in the absence of (other) partiality motivations, is a 
conservative attitude an epistemic desideratum to be considered in forming/maintaining 
one’s current beliefs? If you think we should not turn on the downloader, you have an 
intuition that favors Conservatism. And, in the next section, I will show that your 
intuition for Conservatism is closely related with Uniqueness: If you endorse 
conservative attitudes for epistemic reasons, you should endorse Uniqueness as well, and 
vice versa.  
 
5 Conservatism and Uniqueness 
                                                           
31 Basically, this example is from Christensen (2000: 357). 
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The result that we want to establish here is: Given Impartiality, Conservatism is 
equivalent to Uniqueness.32 To see this, let me start by proving that Conservatism implies 
Uniqueness. 
 
i) Conservatism implies Uniqueness 
We can show that the denial of Uniqueness (Permissivism) implies the denial of 
Conservatism. Note that Permissivism is Permissivism1, Permissivism2, or Permissivism3. 
Thus, in order to show that Permissivism implies the denial of Conservatism, we have to 
prove that each kind of Permissivism implies the denial of Conservatism.  
To see this, first assume that Permissivism1 holds. Because Permissivism1 rejects 
both (1) and (2), it follows by Permissivism1 that there is a possible case in which for 
some proposition X, a total evidence E allows <i1, t1> and <i2, t1> to have different 
credences in X as a rational response to E. On the assumption of Impartiality, 
Permissivism1 implies the intrapersonal counterpart of it (say Intra-Permissivism1) that is, 
according to Impartiality, as compelling as Permissivism1. By Intra-Permissivism1, we 
have: there is a possible case in which the same total evidence E would also allow <i1, t1> 
and <i1, t2> to have different credences in X as a rational response to E. That is, given that 
i1’s total evidence E remains the same between t1 and t2, <i1, t1> and <i1, t2> may have 
different credences in X as a rational response to E. 
                                                           
32 Note that, on the versions that I have in mind, Conservatism is compatible with Impartiality without 
already assuming Uniqueness. To see this, note that (my version of) Impartiality is a meta-requirement that 
says for any epistemic intrapersonal rationality constraint, there must be an epistemic interpersonal 
rationality constraint that is as compelling as the intrapersonal rationality constraint, and vice versa. (The 
version of) Conservatism that I use here is a diachronic intrapersonal rationality requirement: it says how 
your new credence in P after no learning experience relevant to P should be related to your old credences in 
P. Conservatism says nothing about how your new credence in P should be related with other agents’ 
credences in P. Thus Conservatism is compatible with Impartiality without assuming Uniqueness. 
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We should, I think, accept the following: 
 
Remain the Same Thesis (RS): For any rational agent ii, any time tj, tk  (tj < tk) 
and any proposition X and E, ii’s total evidence E for X remains the same between 
tj and tk if and only if either no learning experience happens to ii between tj and tk 
or whatever learning experience does happen between tj and tk is irrelevant to X.33 
 
Then, it follows from RS that there is a possible case in which no learning experience 
happens to i1 between t1 and t2 or any learning experience between t1 and t2 is irrelevant 
to X, but C1(X) ≠ C2(X) where C1 and C2 refer to i1’s credence function at t1 and at t2, 
respectively. This is clearly the violation of Conservatism. Thus we show that, on the 
assumption of Impartiality, Permissivism1 implies the denial of Conservatism.  
Note that in order to prove that Permissivism1 implies the denial of Conservatism, 
I relied on the following implication of Impartiality (IOI):  
 
IOI: If <i1, t1> and <i2, t1> share total evidence E at t1, and <i1, t1> and <i2, t1> are 
permitted at t1 to have different credences r and s in X, then the same credences r 
and s are permissible also for <i1, t1> and <i1, t2> if E is i1's total evidence at t1, at 
t2 and at every instant of time between t1 and t2.  
                                                           
33 Forgetting cases could be a counterexample against RS: Your total evidence for X can change if you 
forget some evidence even though you undergo no learning experience regarding X. Here I restrict my 
discussion to an idealized context where forgetting is not a factor. It is worth investigating how to formulate 
expansions of RS to cover a less idealized context where forgetting matters, and answering the question 
satisfactorily should lead to interesting extensions of RS. However, I will leave that for future research.  
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IOI might be questioned in the following way: Even if <i1, t1> and <i2, t1> are permitted 
to have different credences in X, <i1, t1> and <i1, t2> need not be. If <i1, t2> is aware of 
<i1, t1>’s credences but not the reverse, they are in different evidential situations and the 
credences permitted to <i1, t2> may not be the same as those permitted to <i1, t1>. In 
particular, awareness of the credence that <i1, t1> had may change <i1, t2>’s evidential 
situation. But if <i1, t2>’s evidential situation has changed, then <i1, t1> and <i1, t2> do not 
share the same total evidence E, as IOI supposes.34 
Note that from each of Permissivism2 and Permissivism3, it also follows that there 
is a possible case in which a total evidence E allows <i1, t1> and <i2, t1> to have different 
credences in X as a rational response to E. Thus we can easily show that each of 
Permissivism2 and Permissivism3 also implies the denial of Conservatism as shown 
above. Since, on the assumption of Impartiality, it follows that every kind of 
Permissivism implies the denial of Conservatism, we can conclude that Conservatism 
implies Uniqueness.  
 
ii) Uniqueness implies Conservatism 
Next, we can show that the denial of Conservatism implies the denial of Uniqueness. To 
see this, assume that Conservatism does not hold. Then, it follows that there is a possible 
                                                           
34 Even though we see that this scenario does not undermine IOI, one might still worry that it illustrates 
another sort of problem, namely that consideration of believers whose evidence E remains the same over 
time is consideration of something that hardly ever occurs, since the agent’s intervening beliefs are 
additional evidence. But it is hard to see why a rational believer should regard a past optional response to 
evidence E as new evidence constraining a present response to E, when no alteration to E has occurred in 
the meantime. 
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case in which for some proposition X, even though either no learning experience happens 
to a rational individual i1 or whatever learning experience does happen between t1 and t2 
is irrelevant to X, her credence in X is changed during that time (that is, C1(X) ≠ C2(X)). 
Then, by RS, it follows that i1’s total evidence E for X remains the same between t1 and t2 
but C1(X) ≠ C2(X). This is clearly a violation of Intra-Uniqueness (the intrapersonal 
counterpart of Uniqueness that, according to Impartiality, is as compelling as 
Uniqueness). That is, if Conservatism does not hold, then Intra- Uniqueness does not hold 
too. On the assumption of Impartiality, if Intra-Uniqueness does not hold, then 
Uniqueness (Inter-Uniqueness) does not hold either. Since, on the assumption of 
Impartiality, it follows that the denial of Conservatism implies the denial of Uniqueness, 
we can conclude that Uniqueness implies Conservatism.  
 To sum up, on the assumption of Impartiality that allows the variable ‘x’ in (1) 
and (2) to range over ordered pairs <ii, tj>, then by i) and ii), Conservatism is equivalent 
to Uniqueness.35  
 
6 Conclusion 
I have shown that on the assumption of Impartiality, the rational updating of our 
credences is constrained by Conservatism if and only if Uniqueness holds. Thus, we can 
say that if, on the assumption of Impartiality, Conservatism is a compelling epistemic 
                                                           
35 As I mentioned in footnote 3, there are a number of different versions of Conservatism. Thus, some 
philosophers who have something stronger in mind might not think that Conservatism is equivalent to 
Uniqueness. I agree. (Thanks to David Christensen for this point.) For instance, the strongest version of 
Conservatism says that whatever an agent happens to believe, it is rational for her to retain it, and this sort 
of Conservatism would not follow from Uniqueness. That version is hard to accept, but I acknowledge that 
there are other possible versions. 
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norm, this result could provide an epistemic justification for Uniqueness, or that if, on the 
assumption of Impartiality, Uniqueness is a compelling epistemic norm, this result could 
provide an epistemic justification for Conservatism.36  
Let me close with a brief illustration of how Uniqueness provides an epistemic 
justification for Conservatism on the assumption of Impartiality. According to 
Conservatism, one is justified in continuing to retain one’s credences in the absence of a 
special reason not to. But why? Christensen (1994) says that there seems to be no account 
that succeeds in providing an epistemic justification for Conservatism. On the assumption 
of Impartiality, however, the equivalence of Conservatism and Uniqueness could provide 
such a justification. Why are we epistemically justified in continuing to retain our 
credences in the absence of a special reason not to? Because those credences are uniquely 
rational credal states in a given evidential situation. That is, on the assumption of 
Impartiality, our reasons for maintaining credences are exhausted by our reasons for 
thinking those credences are uniquely rational in a given evidential situation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
36 Or if Uniqueness is questionable, then given Impartiality, Conservatism is questionable too.  
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CHAPTER 3 
COGNITIVE DECISION THEORY AND PERMISSIVE RATIONALITY 
1 Introduction 
Standard decision theory says that a rational action to perform is one with the greatest 
expected utility―one such that the expected practical utility for how states of the world 
will turn out, given your performing it, is at least as high as that of any alternative act you 
might perform. Recently, many philosophers have deployed a decision theoretic approach 
to justify epistemic norms such as Probabilism, Conditionalization, the Principal 
Principle, and the Principle of Indifference.37 Let us call such a strategy Cognitive 
Decision Theory (CDT for short).38 A rational doxastic state (or a rational updating 
policy) to adopt, according to CDT, is one with the greatest expected epistemic 
utility―one such that your expected epistemic utility for how states of the world will turn 
out, given your adopting it, is at least as high as that of any alternative doxastic state you 
might adopt.39 
One of the central issues in epistemology is whether epistemic rationality is 
permissive or not: Some claim that (Uniqueness) for any total evidence, there is a unique 
doxastic state that any agent with that total evidence should take40; others claim that 
                                                           
37 For instance, by resorting to a decision theoretic approach, Joyce (1998, 2009) and Leitgeb and Pettigrew 
(2010a) attempt to justify Probabilism; Easwaran (2013), Greaves and Wallace (2006), and Leitgeb and 
Pettigrew (2010b) attempt to justify Conditionalization; Pettigrew (2013) attempts to justify the Principal 
Principle; Pettigrew (2014) attempts to justify the Principle of Indifference.  
 
38 I’m following Greaves and Wallace (2006) in the use of Cognitive Decision Theory. 
 
39 In section 2, I will explain expected epistemic utilities in detail. ‘A rational doxastic state’ rather than 
‘the rational doxastic state’ to allow two or more of the possible doxastic states to have the same greatest 
expected epistemic utility. 
 
40 For instance, see Feldman (2007); White (2005, 2014); Christensen (2007); Levinstein (2015). 
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(Permissivism) for some total evidence, there are multiple doxastic states that an agent 
with that total evidence can take.41  
How does CDT relate to the debate over permissive rationality? As one way of 
addressing this question, in this paper, I will provide and assess an argument against 
CDT: I will assume that an epistemically rational agent always adopts a doxastic state 
that maximizes her expected epistemic utility, and prove that, at least in some possible 
cases where Non-Strict Epistemic Immodesty (described in section 3) holds, the agent 
who is faithfully represented by CDT can change her doxastic state, absent any new 
evidence. This violates Epistemic Conservatism, which says that one’s doxastic states 
should remain the same, absent any new evidence. This seems to be an unfortunate 
consequence. However, I will further show that when we clearly distinguish among 
several versions of Permissivism/Uniqueness, the argument is not a real threat to any 
cognitive decision theorist. Depending on which version of Permissivism/Uniqueness a 
cognitive decision theorist endorses, they may avoid the argument in one of two general 
ways. One response appeals to the stability of beliefs over time, while the other allows 
that the instability of beliefs over time fits naturally with epistemic rationality.  
I will proceed as follows. Section 2 introduces the framework for CDT. Section 3, 
with the framework in hand, explains Expected Epistemic Utility Maximization and 
Epistemic Immodesty as general norms of CDT that I will assume throughout our 
discussion. In particular, I will make a clear distinction between Strict Epistemic 
Immodesty and Non-Strict Epistemic Immodesty. Section 4 provides a problematic 
example where an agent endorses a non-strict immodest epistemic utility function and, 
                                                           
41 For instance, see Kelly(2014); Schoenfield (2014); Meacham (2014). 
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based on the problematic example, I will offer an argument against CDT. Section 5 
discusses two available responses to the argument against CDT, those involving the 
rejection of Non-Strict Immodesty as a rational constraint, and those involving the 
rejection of Epistemic Conservatism as a rational constraint. In particular, I will focus on 
the former to explore how CDT relates to the debate over Permissivism/ Uniqueness: 
After clearly defining three types of Permissivism (what I call Permissivism1, 
Permissivism2, and Permissivism2, respectively), I will prove that Permissivism1 or 
Permissivism2 entails Non-Strict Immodesty or the denial of Expected Epistemic Utility 
Maximization, and that Uniqueness or Permissivism3 entails Strict Immodesty or the 
denial of Expected Epistemic Utility Maximization. Thus it will be shown that, given 
Uniqueness or Permissivism3, cognitive decision theorists would reject the argument 
against CDT because they would reject Non-Strict Immodesty in favor of Strict 
Immodesty; in contrast, given Permissivism1 or Permissivism2, cognitive decision 
theorists would generally reject the argument against CDT because they would reject 
Epistemic Conservatism. Finally, section 7 is the conclusion with some brief remarks.  
 
2 Cognitive Decision Theory 
CDT provides a framework for determining one’s rational doxastic states. The framework 
for the theory includes states of the world, credence (or degree of belief) functions, 
epistemic utilities and expected epistemic utilities. Let us briefly explicate each of these 
notions below.  
 
2.1 States of the World 
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There is a set S of mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive possible states of the world 
over which an agent has a doxastic state S can be thought of as a set of mutually 
exclusive and jointly exhaustive propositions, or as a partition of the set of possible 
worlds.42,43, The specificity of S will determine how fine-grained our distinctions among 
doxastic states can be.  
 
2.2 Degree of Belief Functions 
It is assumed that, in CDT, an agent’s doxastic state can be represented by some degree of 
belief function c from a set of possible states of the world, S, to the real numbers R.44 
Throughout, let CS be a set of degree of belief functions from S to to the real numbers 
R.45  
 
2.3 Epistemic Utility 
Given a state of the world and an action, a practical utility is a practical desirability of 
the outcome of performing that action when that state of the world in fact obtains. An 
epistemic utility is the epistemic counterpart of that practical utility: Given a state of the 
                                                           
42 What I aim to show does not depend on whether S is finite or infinite. For simplicity, however, we will 
assume that S is finite. Nothing will hinge on this restriction. 
 
43 I use the set-theoretic notation and syntactic notation interchangeably throughout, depending on which 
seems more stylistically convenient. 
 
44 Here we do not have to assume that the agent’s doxastic state should always be modeled by a single 
degree of belief function. For instance, when the agent’s total evidence is unspecific, her doxastic state 
might be represented by a set of degree of belief functions. Many different ways of representing doxastic 
states could be allowed‒so long as there is some way of (precisely or imprecisely) quantifying expected 
epistemic utilities to maximize them. For simplicity, however, we will assume that the agent’s doxastic 
states are modeled by a single degree of belief function. Nothing will hinge on this restriction either. 
 
45 I do not assume Probabilism that says that rational degrees of belief functions are probabilistically 
coherent. Thus CS may contain elements that are probabilistically incoherent. 
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world and a doxastic state, an epistemic utility is a purely epistemic desirability of 
adopting that doxastic state when that state of the world in fact obtains. An epistemic 
utility is concerned with epistemically desirable values, which, many think, include 
accuracy, informativeness, simplicity, and verisimilitude. It would require a substantial 
philosophical investigation to give a full account of the epistemic values, and there could 
be various views on what the epistemic values are. However, what I aim to show is 
compatible with any view on the epistemic values―so long as there is a way of 
quantifying epistemic utilities. 
 It is assumed that, in CDT, an epistemic utility can be represented by some 
epistemic utility function u from pairs in CS ☓ S to the real numbers R.46 For instance, 
u(c, s) refers to some real number that represents the epistemic utility of the doxastic state 
c when s in fact obtains; u(c1, s1) > u(c2, s1) means that adopting c1 is strictly better than 
adopting c2 when s1 in fact obtains; and u(c1, s2) = u(c2, s2) means that adopting c1 is no 
better than adopting c2, and vice versa, when s2 in fact obtains, from the purely epistemic 
perspective. 
There are some conditions that constrain epistemic utility functions. For instance, 
many believe that an epistemic utility function should satisfy Extensionality, which says 
that the epistemic utility is a function of nothing other than the truth values of s ∈ S and 
                                                           
46 Here we do not have to assume that an epistemic utility of an epistemic state should always be modeled 
by a single utility function. For instance, if, given the epistemic state, there are pairs of epistemic values 
that are incommensurable, the epistemic utility of the epistemic state might be represented by the set of 
epistemic utility functions that indicates a range of possible epistemic utilities for the epistemic state. Many 
different ways of representing epistemic utilities could be allowed‒so long as there is some way of 
(precisely or imprecisely) quantifying expected epistemic utilities to maximize them. For simplicity, 
however, we will assume that the agent’s epistemic utilities are modeled by a single epistemic utility 
function.  
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degrees of belief that c ∈ CS assigns to the states of the world.47 Extensionality is not 
necessarily required for my purposes,48 but the following two conditions are required: 
 
Quantifiability: All epistemic utilities can be numerically measured. 
Continuity: When two epistemic states are sufficiently similar, then their 
epistemic utilities are also similar.49  
 
I do not have space here to give a full account of Quantifiability and Continuity, but for 
my purposes in this paper, it is enough to assume them rather to justify them, as many 
cognitive decision theorists do.  
 
2.4 Expected Epistemic Utilities 
An expected epistemic utility of adopting a doxastic state x ∈ CS with respect to c ∈ CS is 
given by weighting x’s epistemic utility at each state of the world s ∈ S by the degree of 
belief that c assigns to that state of the world, and summing: EUc(x) = ∑s∈S c(s)u(x, s). An 
agent’s expected epistemic utility of a doxastic state x ∈ CS is an estimation of x’s 
epistemic utility from the perspective of the agent’s current doxastic state.   
 
                                                           
47 See Joyce (1998: 591). 
 
48 For instance, if the epistemic utility is in part based on informativeness, it cannot be extensional because 
informativeness of an epistemic state is not extensional. However, what I aim to show applies to any 
version of CDT in which Extensionality holds as well.  
 
49 Note that these conditions assume Externalism that says “the value of a cognitive state depends on 
features external to the cognitive state” such as which state of the world in fact obtains. See Oddie (1997: 
537) for this point. 
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3 Two General Norms for Cognitive Decision Theory 
Among the general norms that may dictate how epistemic utilities constrain the set of 
rational doxastic states, two are relevant for my purposes: Expected Epistemic Utility 
Maximization and Epistemic Immodesty. 
 
3.1 Expected Epistemic Utility Maximization 
It is very intuitive to say: An agent ought to adopt a doxastic state that has the highest 
expected epistemic utility of all possible doxastic states with respect to the agent’s current 
doxastic state. More formally, with the framework for CDT in hand, where Mc is the set 
of degree of belief functions that maximize epistemic utility with respect to the agent’s 
current doxastic state c, the norm that I have in mind holds:  
 
Expected Epistemic Utility Maximization: Given an agent’s degree of belief 
function c ∈ CS, let Mc⊆ CS be such that, for all x, y ∈ Mc and for all z ∈ CS ~ Mc, 
EUc (x) = EUc (y) and EUc (x) > EUc (z). The agent should adopt a member of Mc 
and could adopt any member of Mc.50   
 
Note that, given Expected Epistemic Utility Maximization (Maximization for short), when 
Mc is a non-empty and non-singleton set, an agent who holds a degree of belief function c 
would satisfy it, as long as the agent adopts any member of Mc. 
 
3.2 Epistemic Immodesty 
                                                           
50 The notation CS~MC denotes the set of elements of CS that are not in MC. 
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It is also very intuitive to say: If an agent is epistemically rational, out of all of the 
possible doxastic states she could adopt, the agent has the best one from the perspective 
of her doxastic state. More formally, with the framework for CDT in hand, the norm that I 
have in mind holds:  
 
Epistemic Immodesty: For all x ∈ CS, if a rational agent’s current degree of 
belief function is x, then the agent should take her own degrees of belief, x, to 
maximize expected epistemic utility. In other words, Mx contains x.  
 
Let us call the denial of Epistemic Immodesty Epistemic Modesty. In this paper, though 
this might not be uncontroversial,51 I will assume that Epistemic Modesty is not rational. I 
think that this assumption is plausible because when an agent adopts a modest doxastic 
state, as Joyce (2009: 277) points out,  
 
“She has a prima facie epistemic reason, grounded in her beliefs, to think that she 
should not be relying on those very beliefs. This is a probabilistic version of 
Moore’s paradox. Just as a rational person cannot fully believe ‘X but I don’t 
believe X,’ so a person cannot rationally hold a set of credences that require her to 
estimate that some other set has higher epistemic utility. The modest person is 
always in this pathological position: her beliefs undermine themselves.”  
 
                                                           
51 For instance, Christensen (2013) and Lasonen-Aarnio (2014) argue that sorts of epistemic modesty are 
compatible with epistemic rationality. However, I am not sure that their versions of epistemic modesty are 
same as what I take to be Epistemic Modesty here. 
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It is noteworthy that, regarding Epistemic Immodesty, we can make a distinction 
as follows:  
 
Strict Immodesty: For all x ∈ CS, if a rational agent’s current credence function 
is x, then the agent should take her own degree of belief function to uniquely 
maximize expected epistemic utility. That is, Mx contains only x.  
Non-Strict Immodesty: For all x ∈ CS, if a rational agent’s current credence 
function is x, then the agent should take her own degree of belief function to be a 
member of Mx that possibly contains other degree of belief functions too. That is, 
Mx contains x and possibly other degrees of belief functions too.52, 53 
 
Given Strict Immodesty, for all x ∈ CS, when an agent’s current credence function is x, 
for any y ∈ CS  (x ≠ y), EUx (x) > EUx (y). On the other hand, given Non-Strict 
Immodesty, for all x ∈ CS, when an agent’s current credence function is x, for any y ∈ CS 
(x ≠ y), EUx (x) ≥ EUx (y).  
Before proceeding further, let us briefly consider the general question that 
cognitive decision theorists often face: Are cognitive decisions really decisions? As 
opposed to our actions, our epistemic states are not voluntary: they are not subject to our 
(direct) control. Thus one might claim that it is inappropriate to apply the decision 
                                                           
52 Some philosophers endorse Strict Immodesty but reject Non-Strict Immodesty. For example, see Joyce 
(2009); Oddie (1997); Gibbard (2007). And, as far as I know, no philosopher endorses Non-Strict 
Immodesty but rejects Strict Immodesty. 
 
53 Note that, when an agent’s degrees of belief function is x, Strict/Non-Strict Immodesty constrains the 
membership of Mx, while Maximization says that the agent should adopt a member of Mx and could adopt 
any member of Mx.    
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theoretic approach to epistemic rationality. In response to this objection, I am following 
Weintraub (2001) who argues as follows: 
  
“it is better to reject altogether the assumption that voluntariness is a prerequisite 
for the applicability of decision-theoretic considerations. This rejection is seen to 
be principled once we understand more clearly their role; the kind of standard of 
assessment for beliefs they are supposed to provide. … Decision theory can 
provide a standard relative to which the rationality of beliefs is assessed, as does 
Bayesian confirmation theory. That it also provides a standard for assessing the 
rationality of action, which is voluntary, does not mean that it can only be used to 
this end.” (Weintraub 2001: 57; italics in original)  
 
4 Argument against Cognitive Decision Theory 
The result that we want to establish here is: Given Non-Strict Immodesty and Epistemic 
Conservatism, Cognitive Decision Theory is not the correct theory of epistemic 
rationality. Note that this result can apply to any decision theoretic approach to epistemic 
rationality, which assumes Quantifiability, Continuity, Expected Epistemic Utility 
Maximization, and Epistemic (non-strict) Immodesty: It does not depend on any particular 
epistemic utility functions, so long as they satisfy those constraints. Now let us start by 
considering the following cases: 
 
 Two Astrophysicists Case 
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Suppose that Brian is an astrophysicist, and has of course a fairly extensive body 
of degrees of belief about the multiverse that he deems best at t0. In his 
department of physics, there is another astrophysicist, Andrei, who shares the 
same total evidence regarding the multiverse but disagrees with him on some 
issues about it at t0. At t1, Brian considers Andrei’s t0-opinions and his own t0-
opinions deeply and thoroughly, and makes rational adjustments to his own 
accordingly. At t2 (after making adjustments), however, Brian realizes that he still 
disagrees with Andrei on some issues about the multiverse and has a good reason 
to think that Andrei’s degrees of belief about the multiverse are just as 
epistemically good as his owns are. Thus, as an epistemic utility maximizer, Brian 
puts Andrei’s opinions on a par with his owns.  
 
Let S be a set of mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive propositions about the 
multiverse over which Brian (and Andrei) has degrees of belief. And let ai and bi refer to 
Andrei’s and Brian’s degree of belief function at ti, respectively. (i ∈ {0, 1, 2}.) Then we 
can summarize Brian’s epistemic situations as follows: ai, bi ∈ CS; for all x ∈ CS ~ Mb2, 
EUb2 (b2) > EUb2 (x); ai, b2 ∈ Mb2, and thus EUb2 (b2) = EUb2 (ai).54 Note that at t2, Brian 
holds a non-strictly immodest epistemic utility function.55  
                                                           
54 It is assumed that Andrei retains his degrees of belief between t0 to t2. 
 
55 Note that when the expected accuracy is the only thing that matters to epistemic utility, it is still possible 
that Brian’s and Andrei’s degrees of belief are non-identical, yet have the equal expected accuracy, with 
respect to Brian’s epistemic perspective. To illustrate, suppose that accuracy is measured by the following 
function: u(c, s) = c(s), which is suggested by Horwich (1982). Suppose further that S = {P, ~P}; CS = {<0, 
1>, <½, ½>, <1, 0>}; b2(P) = ½. Then, for any x ∈CS, EUb2(x) = x(P)(2b2(P) - 1) - (b2(P) - 1). Thus, 
whether a2(P) = 1 or a2(P) = 0, EUb2(b2) = EUb2(a2) = ½. That is, there are some cases in which Brian’s and 
Andrei’s degrees of belief are non-identical, yet have the equal expected accuracy, with respect to Brian’s 
epistemic perspective, given some restrictions on epistemic utility functions and degrees of belief functions. 
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Now let us consider the following argument: 
Argument against CDT  (AAC) 
P1:  Non-Strict Immodesty allows a rational agent to hold a non-strictly immodest 
epistemic utility function.  
P2: Given Expected Epistemic Utility Maximization, for any agent who holds a 
non-strictly immodest epistemic utility function, doxastic state shifts from one 
degree of belief function to another may be rational, even in the absence of new 
evidence. 
C1: Given Expected Epistemic Utility Maximization, rational agents are allowed, 
in the absence of new evidence, to rationally make doxastic state shifts from one 
degree of belief function to another. (From P1, P2) 
P3: Given Epistemic Conservatism, in the absence of new evidence, a rational 
agent’s degree of belief in any proposition should remain the same. 
C2: Therefore, CDT is not the correct theory of epistemic rationality.56 (From C1, 
P3) 
 
AAC is valid: If we accept P1, P2, and P3, we should also accept C2.57 P2 is 
uncontroversial. For any agent who holds a non-strictly immodest epistemic utility 
function, when the agent currently holds degree of belief function x ∈ CS, it is possible 
                                                           
56 This argument is basically the same as one given by Greaves and Wallace (2006: 630). (As Greaves and 
Wallace point out, Maher (1993: 179) suggests the original argument, with which Weintraub (2001) 
agrees.) However, even though they seem to see the possibility (see their footnote 13 (p. 629)), they apply 
their argument only to modest epistemic utility functions. 
 
57 Note that CDT recommends Expected Epistemic Utility Maximization. 
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that there is another distinct degree of belief function y ∈ Cs such that x, y ∈ Mx, and thus 
EUx (x) = EUx (y). That is, x and y are of equal and optimal expected epistemic utility 
from the perspective the agent in the doxastic state x itself. Given Maximization, as 
Greaves and Wallace point out, “when this occurs, the agent can stick to his current 
[degree of belief function x], but it will be equally consistent with ideal rationality if he 
chooses to move to [degree of belief function y] on a whim.”58 Note that Non-Strict 
Immodesty itself does not recommend the agent who currently holds degree of belief 
function x to move to another degree of belief function y. However, given Maximization, 
when x, y ∈ Mx, moving to another degree of belief function y is as epistemically rational 
as sticking to the current degree of belief function x. Since P2 holds, P1 and P3 are the 
argument’s only questionable steps. 
 
5 Responses 
There are only two options to reject the argument: those involving the rejection of Non-
Strict Immodesty as a rational constraint, and those involving the rejection of Epistemic 
Conservatism as a rational constraint. As already mentioned, my main purpose of this 
paper is to figure out how CDT relates to the debate over Permissivism (or Uniqueness). 
Thus, in this section, I will focus on the former. Before addressing it in detail, however, 
let us briefly consider Epistemic Conservatism.  
 
5.1 Non-Conservatives are sometimes rational (Rejection of P3) 
                                                           
58 Greaves and Wallace (2006: 621). Brackets are mine. See Oddie (1997: 537) for a similar point. 
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To illustrate Epistemic Conservatism, suppose that over a given period time you learn 
nothing. Then how should you change your degree of belief in the proposition that (H) 
the number of polar bears in Alaska is even, after no learning experience? It is very 
intuitive in such a case to say: your degree of belief in H should remain the same in the 
absence of a learning experience. On this way of thinking, the following principle seems 
to be assumed:  
 
Epistemic Conservatism: When a rational agent undergoes no learning 
experience, her degree of belief in any proposition should remain the same.59 
 
Many philosophers seem to accept Epistemic Conservatism (Conservatism for short) by 
endorsing various motivations. For instance, some philosophers endorse a pragmatic 
motivation for Conservatism: They claim that Conservatism would be required from a 
pragmatic perspective because, other things being equal, changing one’s mind is an 
energy consuming process.60 Other philosophers endorse a learning-preserving 
motivation for Conservatism: They claim that Conservatism would be required from an 
epistemic perspective because, given your degrees of belief properly reflect what you 
have learned, conservative doxastic attitudes would preserve what you have learned.61 
Still other philosophers, however, seem to reject Conservatism. For instance, after 
                                                           
59 This is a special version of Epistemic Conservatism for an agent who learns nothing. There is, of course, 
a more general version. For example, see Christensen (1994), Harman (1986), and Sklar (1975). 
 
60 See Sklar (1975). 
 
61 See Harman (1986). 
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arguing that no account has succeeded in providing an epistemic justification for 
Conservatism, Christensen (2000) rejects Conservatism in favor of Epistemic Impartiality 
that says “The considerations determining which beliefs it would be epistemically 
rational for an agent to adopt do not give special status to any of the agent’s present 
opinions on the basis of their belonging to the agent.”62  
Which side should we take? I think, in many cases, it is very intuitive to have 
conservative doxastic attitudes. When there is no learning experience, isn’t it irrational to 
change one’s mind on a whim? It seems so, and the denial of Conservatism seems to 
allow us to change our minds in such a way. However, I have no argument at this 
moment for Conservatism. Thus, to those who reject Conservatism, I simply suggest the 
argument against CDT from P1and P2 to the following adjusted conclusion (subjunctive 
conditional): 
 
C3: If Conservatism were correct, Cognitive Decision Theory would not be the 
correct theory of epistemic rationality. (From P1 and P2) 
 
                                                           
62 Here Christensen seems to assume that all versions of Conservatism are in tension with Epistemic 
Impartiality. However, I think, some versions are compatible with Epistemic Impartiality. For instance, 
according to the learning-preserving motivation for Conservatism, in the absence of relevant changes in 
evidence, when credences properly reflect what you have learned (or your evidence as it accumulates), the 
consideration determining which credences you would adopt gives special status to your own previous 
credences not simply due to the fact that you had those credences, but to the fact that your credences 
themselves are your repository of past learning. Thus, on the assumption of such a moderate motivation, if 
there is another (possible) agent whose credences also reflect what you have learned (or your total 
evidence) as properly as your credences do, it would be natural that the consideration determining which 
credences you would adopt gives special status not only to your own previous credences but also to her 
credences. Note that when there is no such an agent, even if the consideration gives special status only to 
your previous credences, it would not violate Epistemic Impartiality. That is, if your consideration relies on 
the only resource available to you, this constitutes no violation of Epistemic Impartiality as long as there is 
no point at which the consideration discriminates between credal states solely on the basis of the fact that 
some credal state is yours. 
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The argument is still valid. Thus anyone who accepts P1 and P2 should also accept C3. 
However, I do not think that this conclusion is strong enough to be a real threat to any 
cognitive decision theorist who rejects Conservatism.  
 
5.2 Non-Strict Immodesty is not rational (Rejection of P1) 
Now let us consider P1: Non-Strict Immodesty allows a rational agent to hold a non-
strictly immodest epistemic utility function. Is Non-Strict Immodesty a rational 
constraint? Whether we should accept P1 or not depends on whether there are some cases 
like Two Astrophysicists in which there is more than one rational doxastic state to a given 
total evidence from one’s epistemic perspective. In fact, it will turn out that there are very 
intricate connections between the debate over Strict/Non-Strict Immodesty and the debate 
over Permissivism/Uniqueness. To see this, let me first briefly explain what Permissivism 
and Uniqueness are. 
 
5.2.1 Permissivism and Uniqueness 
Permissivism says that for some evidence E, there are multiple doxastic states, any one of 
which a possible agent with that total evidence E can rationally take. Uniqueness is the 
denial of Permissivism. As Meacham (2014: 1188) points out, Uniqueness is equivalent 
to the conjunction of the following two claims: 
 
(1) (Agent Uniqueness) For any possible agent with a total evidence E, there is only 
one permissible degree of belief function for that agent. 
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(2) (Permission Parity) The same degree of belief functions are permissible for all 
possible agents who share a total evidence E.63, 64 
 
Thus, following Meacham (2014), we can distinguish three types of Permissivism. 
 
Permissivism1: One that rejects both (1) and (2) 
Permissivism2:  One that rejects (1) but accepts (2) 
Permissivism3: One that accepts (1) but rejects (2) 
 
Note that Permissivism1, Permissivism2, Permissivism3, and Uniqueness are mutually 
exclusive and collectively exhaustive.  
It is noteworthy that, according to Permissivism3 or Uniqueness, no total evidence 
is permissive with respect to the range of rational doxastic states open to any particular 
individual, while, according to Permissivism1 or Permissivism2, some total evidence is 
permissive with respect to that. Thus, even though Permissivism1, Permissivism2, and 
Permissivism3 are all permissive principles, there is a crucial difference between 
                                                           
63 I am following Feldman (2007), Meacham (2014), and White (2005) in the use of Uniqueness and 
Permissivism. In particular, Uniqueness is what Meacham (2014: 1187) calls Evidential Uniqueness, which 
implies that the evidence alone suffices to fix what a rational credal state is. There could be other versions 
of Uniqueness (and Permissivism). For my purposes in this paper, a different version of Uniqueness (and 
Permissivism) could be allowed‒so long as there are counterparts of Agent Uniqueness and Permission 
Parity, respectively, for that version. 
 
64 For the proof of the equivalence, see Meacham (2014: 1188). Note that regarding Agent Uniqueness and 
Permission Parity, Meacham restricts degree of belief functions to priors functions that only tabula rasa 
agents who satisfy two Bayesian normative constraints (Probabilism and Conditionalization) can take. 
However, regarding (1) and (2), we do not have such a restriction here: Agent Uniqueness and Permission 
Parity can apply to any degree of belief function, without assuming the Bayesian normative constraints.  
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Permissivism1 (or Permissivism2) and Permissivism3: Permissivism1 and Permissivism2 
appeal to the following two permissive intuitions: 
 
Permissive Intuition 1: There are evidential situations in which two different 
agents can rationally adopt different beliefs. 
Permissive Intuition 2: There are evidential situations in which a particular agent 
can rationally adopt a range of different beliefs.65  
 
In contrast, Permissivism3 appeals only to Permissive Intuition 1. 
 
5.2.2 Strict/Non-Strict Immodesty and Impermissive/Permissive Rationality 
We can prove that Permissivism1 or Permissivism2 entails Non-Strict Immodesty or the 
denial of Maximization, and that Uniqueness or Permissivism3 entails Strict Immodesty or 
the denial of Maximization. To see this, let me start by proving that Strict Immodesty and 
Maximization entail Permissivism3 or Uniqueness. Note that Strict Immodesty says that, 
for all x ∈ CS, if a rational agent’s current degree of belief function is x, then Mx={x}. 
Thus, assuming Strict Immodesty and Maximization, given a total evidence E, if an agent, 
A, who holds a strictly immodest epistemic utility function has degree of belief function 
x, there is a unique rational epistemic state, x, that A with the total evidence E should 
take. And, assuming Strict Immodesty and Maximization, given the same total evidence 
E, if another agent, B, who also holds a strictly immodest epistemic utility function has 
degree of belief function y, there is a unique rational epistemic state, y, that B with the 
                                                           
65 The distinction between two permissive intuitions is from Meacham (2014: 1190). 
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total evidence E should take. It is a logical truth that, for every E, x=y, or, for some E, 
x≠y. If, for every E, x=y, Uniqueness follows. On the other hand, if, for some E, x≠y, 
Permissivism3 follows. Thus we have shown that Strict Immodesty and Maximization 
entail Uniqueness or Permissivism3.66 Assuming that only immodest epistemic utility 
functions are rational,67 from the fact that Strict Immodesty and Maximization entail 
Permissivism3 or Uniqueness, it follows by contraposition that Permissivism1 and 
Permissivism2 each entail Non-Strict Immodesty or the denial of Maximization.68  
Similarly, we can easily show that Non-Strict Immodesty and Maximization entail 
Permissivism1 or Permissivism2.69 Non-Strict Immodesty says that, for all x ∈ CS, if a 
rational agent’s current degree of belief function is x, then x ∈ Mx that is possibly a non-
singleton. Thus, assuming Non-Strict Immodesty and Maximization, given a total 
evidence E, if an agent, C, who holds a non-strictly immodest epistemic utility function 
has degree of belief function x, there may be a set of multiple rational epistemic states, 
Mx, anyone of which A with the total evidence E could rationally take. And, assuming 
Non-Strict Immodesty and Maximization, given the same total evidence E, if another 
agent, D, who also holds a non-strictly immodest epistemic utility function has degree of 
belief function y, there may be a set of multiple rational epistemic states, My, anyone of 
which D with the total evidence E could rationally take. It is a logical truth that, for every 
                                                           
66 Note that the reverse does not hold because, for instance, given the denial of Maximization, Non-Strict 
Immodesty is compatible with Uniqueness and Permissivism3.  
 
67 As already mentioned, this is not uncontroversial though. 
 
68 Note that Permissivism1, Permissivism2, Permissivism3, and Uniqueness are mutually exclusive and 
collectively exhaustive.  
 
69 The reverse does not hold either because, for instance, given the denial of Maximization, Strict 
Immodesty is compatible with Permissivism1 and Permissivism2. 
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E, Mx=My, or, for some E, Mx≠My. If, for every E, Mx=My, Permissivism2 follows. On the 
other hand, if, for some E, Mx≠My, Permissivism1 follows. Thus, assuming that only 
immodest epistemic utility functions are rational, it follows by contraposition that 
Uniqueness or Permissivism3 entails Strict Immodesty or the denial of Maximization. 
 
5.2.3 AAC and Permissive Rationality 
To cognitive decision theorists who have an intuition that favors Permissivism3 or 
Uniqueness, AAC is not a real threat to CDT because they can reject P1 in favor of Strict 
Immodesty. For instance, they can provide the following argument for Strict Immodesty: 
 
Argument for Strict Immodesty70 
O1: Strict Immodesty or Non-Strict Immodesty  
O2: Non-Strict Immodesty 
O3: Maximization  
C’1: the denial of Conservatism. (From O2 and O3) 
O4: Conservatism 
C’2: the denial of O2 (From C’1 and O4) 
C’3: Therefore, Strict Immodesty (From C2’ and O1) 
 
Note that, as I explained above, given Maximization, Non-Strict Immodesty entails the 
denial of Conservatism. Thus, assuming Conservatism, in order to avoid contradiction, 
we should reject either O2 or O3. Cognitive decision theorists would reject O2, and hence 
                                                           
70 This argument is from Oddie (1997: 535-8). 
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C’3 follows.71 Someone who accepts Permissivism3 or Uniqueness would take this 
strategy and reject P1 of AAC.  
However, what about cognitive decision theorists who have an intuition that 
favors Permissivism1 or Permissivism2? As shown above, given Permissivism1 or 
Permissivism2, Non-Strict Immodesty or the denial of Maximization follows, and hence, 
to cognitive decision theorists who endorse Permissivism1 or Permissivism2, the 
conclusion of AAC (C2) appears to follow: If they accept Non-Strict Immodesty (P1), 
given Conservatism, C2 follows; if they reject Maximization, C2 also immediately 
follows because CDT recommends Maximization. Then, is AAC a real threat to those 
permissive cognitive decision theorists? As I will show below, it need not be, because 
they would generally reject Conservatism. 
 
5.2.4 Conservatism and Permissive Rationality 
Let us begin by making a distinction between what I call interpersonal impermissive 
import and intrapersonal impermissive import. When the principles, Agent Uniqueness 
and Permission Parity, only compare different individuals (‘a possible agent’ ranges only 
over possible individuals), they have interpersonal impermissive import. When Agent 
Uniqueness and Permission Parity compare an agent’s selves (or time-slices) at different 
times (‘a possible agent’ in ranges over an agent’s selves at different times), they have 
intrapersonal impermissive import.72 Table 2 provides another illustration of the 
differences between Permissivism1 (or Permissivism2), Permissivism3, and Uniqueness in 
                                                           
71 See Oddie (1997: 537). 
 
72 I’m following Kelly (2014) in the use of interpersonal and intrapersonal import. 
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terms of interpersonal and intrapersonal impermissive import: Uniqueness has 
interpersonal as well as intrapersonal impermissive import; Permissivism3 has only 
intrapersonal impermissive import and lacks interpersonal impermissive import; both 
Permissivism1 and Permissivism2 lack interpersonal as well as intrapersonal 
impermissive import. 
 
Table 2  
Comparison between Permissivism1, Permissivism2, Permissivism3, and Uniqueness II  
 
Interpersonal Impermissive 
Import 
Intrapersonal Impermissive 
Import 
Permissivism1 X X 
Permissivism2 X X 
Permissivism3 X O 
Uniqueness O O 
 
 
If a principle has intrapersonal impermissive import, it satisfies Conservatism. Thus 
Permissivism3 and Uniqueness are compatible with Conservatism.73 To illustrate, suppose 
that Permissivism3 holds. Note that Permissivism3 is motivated by only Permissive 
Intuitions 1(See section 5.2.1): it is permissive across individuals (interpersonal 
permissive import) but impermissive across time-slices of any particular individual 
                                                           
73 As pointed out in chapter 1, on the assumption of epistemic impartiality that says that there are no 
significant differences between intrapersonal and interpersonal rationality requirements when determining 
what credal states one ought to have for purposes of epistemic evaluation, Uniqueness is equivalent to 
Conservatism, and so Permissivism3 is incompatible with Conservatism. But I do not assume epistemic 
impartiality here. 
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(intrapersonal impermissive import). Then there is an evidential situation (say total 
evidence E) in which two agents, say John and Paul, who share the total evidence E have 
different doxastic states, D1 and D2 (D1 ≠ D2), which are uniquely permissible for John 
and Paul, respectively (D1 for John and D2 for Paul). Suppose further that John and Paul 
with the total evidence E undergo no learning experience between t1 and t2. That is, E is 
John and Paul's total evidence at t1, at t2 and at every instant of time between t1 and t2. 
Then, we can lay out Paul’s doxastic history and John’s between t1 and t2, respectively, as 
follows: 
 
Figure 2  
Comparison between Paul’s doxastic history and John’s doxastic history II 
Paul’s doxastic history between t1 and t2 
…………….. D1…………. at time t2          (Only D1 is permissible for Paul.)  
                       ↑                                        
…………….. D1…………...at time t1      (Only D1 is permissible for Paul.)        
                       
 
John’s doxastic history between t1 and t2 
…………….. D2………… at time t2      (Only D2 is permissible for John.)   
                      ↑                                        
…………….. D2……..….. at time t1      (Only D2 is permissible for John.) 
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At each time, Paul and John should have D1 and D2 respectively, and thus they naturally 
satisfy Conservatism between t1 and t2.74  
Permissivism1 and Permissivism2 are motivated by Permissive Intuitions 1 and 2 
(See section 5.2.1): they are permissive across individuals (interpersonal permissive 
import) and permissive across time-slices of any particular individual (intrapersonal 
permissive import) as well. As just shown above, Permissive Intuitions 1 is compatible 
with Conservatism. However, generally, Permissive Intuition 2 is in tension with 
Conservatism. To see this, following Meacham (2014: 1190), let us divide Permissive 
Intuition 2 into two parts: 
 
Permissive Intuition 2a: There are tabula rasa cases in which a particular agent 
can rationally adopt a range of different beliefs. 
Permissive Intuition 2b: There are non-tabula rasa cases in which a particular 
agent can rationally adopt a range of different beliefs. 
 
Of course, Permissive Intuition 2a is compatible with Conservatism because, in any case 
that invokes only Permissive Intuition 2a, Conservatism is vacuously satisfied, but 
Permissive Intuition 2b is in tension with Conservatism. To illustrate, suppose that there 
are two permissible initial doxastic states, R1 and R2 (R1 ≠ R2), open to two tabula rasa 
agents, called Cody and Luke, at time t0. Suppose further that Cody and Luke begin in 
initial doxastic states, R1 and R2, respectively, and undergo no learning experience 
                                                           
74 We can easily show that Uniqueness is also compatible with Conservatism in a similar way. 
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between t0 and t1. Then, we can lay out Cody’s doxastic history and Luke’s between t0 
and t1, respectively (see Figure 3). 
In the case under consideration, at t0, Permissivism2 is clearly compatible with 
Conservatism, because Conservatism is vacuously satisfied. However, at t1, 
Permissivism2 is no longer compatible with Conservatism: Given Conservatism, two 
agents have uniquely permissible credences, respectively (R1 for Cody and R2 for Luke), 
or, if Permissivism2 holds at t1, Conservatism does not hold, because it is rational for the 
agent to change one’s doxastic state, in the absence of new evidence.75 
 
Figure 3  
Comparison between Cody’s doxastic history and Luke’s doxastic history 
Cody’s doxastic history between t0 and t1 
…………….. R1…………. at time t1          (If Conservatism holds, only R1 is permissible 
for Cody; if R1 and R2 are still permissible for Cody, Conservatism does not hold.) 
                       ↑                                        
…………….. R1…………. at time t0        (R1 and R2 are permissible for Cody and 
Conservatism holds.)        
 
Luke’s doxastic history between t0 and t1 
…………….. R2………… at time t1      (If Conservatism holds, only R2 is permissible for 
Luke; if R1 and R2 are still permissible for Luke, Conservatism does not hold.)   
                      ↑                                        
                                                           
75 We can easily show that Permissivism1 is also incompatible with Conservatism in a similar way. 
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…………….. R2………… at time t0      (R1 and R2 are permissible for Luke and 
Conservatism holds.) 
 
In sum, Permissivism3 and Uniqueness are compatible with Conservatism; 
Permissivism1 and Permissivism2 are compatible or incompatible with Conservatism: to 
tabula rasa agents, Permissivism2 (or Permissivism1) is compatible with Conservatism, 
while, to non-tabula rasa agents, they are incompatible with each other. 
Now let us return to our original question: Is AAC a real threat to those cognitive 
decision theorists who endorse Permissivism1 or Permissivism2? To tabula rasa agents 
who hold Permissivism1 or Permissivism2, the conclusion (C2) of AAC does not follow 
because, in any situation where only tabula rasa agents are located, Non-Strict 
Immodesty and Maximization do not entail the denial of Conservatism. (Note that in any 
initial (synchronic) case in which the tabula rasa agents are located, Conservatism 
vacuously holds.) To non-tabula rasa agents who hold Permissivism1 or Permissivism2, 
the conclusion (C2) of AAC does not follow because they would reject Conservatism. Of 
course, they should accept C3 (if Conservatism were correct, Cognitive Decision Theory 
would not be the correct theory of epistemic rationality), but C3 is not strong enough 
against CDT. Therefore, AAC is not a real threat to cognitive decision theorists who 
endorse Permissivism1 or Permissivism2. 
To sum up, then, we have considered an argument against CDT (AAC): On the 
assumption of Conservatism, the correct theory of epistemic rationality will not endorse 
non-conservative doxastic state shifts from one degree of belief function to another, in the 
absence of new evidence. In Two Astrophysicists case where Non-Strict Immodesty holds, 
59 
 
 
 
CDT endorses non-conservative doxastic state shifts, in the absence of new evidence: It is 
non-conservative for Brian who currently holds degree of belief function x to move to 
another degree of belief function y, in the absence of new evidence, and CDT endorses 
such a doxastic state shift. This seems to be an unfortunate consequence. When we 
clearly divide up permissive/impermissive doxastic attitudes, however, we can see that 
AAC is not a real threat to any cognitive decision theorist: To those who endorse 
Uniqueness or Permissivism3, AAC is not a real threat to CDT because they would reject 
Non-Strict Immodesty in favor of Strict Immodesty; to those who endorse Permissivism1 
or Permissivism2, AAC is not a real threat to CDT either because AAC could not be 
applied to them (when they are tabula rasa agents) or because they would reject 
Conservatism (when they are non-tabula rasa agents). 
 
6 Conclusion 
As I have shown above, depending on which versions of Permissivism/Uniqueness 
cognitive decision theorists embrace, they would respond to AAC in significantly 
different ways. Which one is better? At this point, I have no argument for making any 
alliance. However, I think we can safely say that a cognitive decision theorist who 
endorses Uniqueness or Permissivism3 would expect more stability of beliefs over time, 
while a cognitive decision theorist who endorses Permissivism1 or Permissivism2 would 
allow that the possibility of changing one’s beliefs on a whim fits naturally with 
epistemic rationality. The latter does not fit well with my intuition. However, someone 
60 
 
 
 
who leans toward Permissivism1 or Permissivism2 may regard it as unintuitive that beliefs 
are required to be ‘excessively stable’.76 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
76 For instance, she may claim that Conservatism is counterintuitive because, given permissive1 total 
evidence E, Conservatism implies that a rational believer should regard her past optional response to 
evidence E as a new constraint on a present response to E, when no alteration to E has occurred in the 
meantime. 
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CHAPTER 4 
STEADFASTNESS, DEFERENCE, AND PERMISSIVE RATIONALITY 
1 Introduction 
The following three are closely related theses, each of which is central to recent work on 
permissive/impermissive epistemic rationality and epistemology of disagreement:  
 
Steadfast: For some total evidence E, if two or more (maximally) rational agents 
who share that total evidence E have different doxastic states, they can rationally 
retain their own doxastic states regardless of what other’s doxastic states turn out 
to be. (Let’s call the denial of Steadfast Conciliationism.)77 
 
Deference: If one knows that her initial doxastic state is not maximally rational, 
she should defer to any doxastic states that she thinks may be maximally 
rational.78 
 
Uniqueness: For any total evidence E, there is a unique doxastic state that any 
possible agent with total evidence E should take. (Let’s call the denial of 
Uniqueness Permissivism.)79 
 
                                                           
77 I am following Christensen (2009) in the use of Steadfast (and Conciliationism). 
 
78 I am following Levinstein (2015) in the use of Deference. 
 
79 I am following Feldman (2007), Meacham (2014), and White (2005) in the use of Uniqueness (and 
Permissivism). In particular, Uniqueness is what Meacham (2014: 1187) calls Evidential Uniqueness, 
which implies that the evidence alone suffices to fix what a rational credal state is. 
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How do Steadfast and Deference relate to Uniqueness (or Permissivism)? Recently, 
regarding this question, Levinstein (2015) offers two interesting arguments: In his first 
argument, Levinstein claims that a tension between Permissivism and Steadfast in the 
face of epistemic peer disagreement generally leads us to what he calls moderate 
Conciliationism, which says that “if [two agents] recognize that the other is rational and 
that they share the same relevant evidence, they should at least modify their credences in 
p when they discover they disagree”80; in his second argument, he argues that, given an 
‘extremely weak version of a deference principle,’ Permissivism collapses into 
Uniqueness.  
However, in this paper, I shall argue that both arguments fail as a defense of 
moderate Conciliationism and Uniqueness, respectively. When we clearly distinguish 
among several types of Permissivism (what I call Permissivism1, Permissivism2, and 
Permissivism3), we can see that Permissivism fits well with Steadfast, and that, even on 
the assumption of the ‘extremely weak version of a deference principle,’ Permissivism 
does not collapse into Uniqueness. First, I will show that, even on all of the assumptions 
that Levinstein takes for granted throughout his arguments, both arguments fail to rule 
out a particular type of Permissivism (Permissivism3); Second, in response to Levinstein’s 
first argument for moderate Conciliationism, I will show that, given some additional 
plausible assumptions, Permissivism1 and Permissivism2 are also compatible with 
Steadfast. Third, in response to Levinstein’s second arguments for Uniqueness, which 
may be seen as providing good reason to reject some types of Permissivism 
(Permissivism1 and Permissivism2), I will also show that, in some permissible cases, the 
                                                           
80 Levinstein (2015: 3). The bracket is mine. 
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‘extremely weak version of a deference principle’ is not in tension with Permissivism1 
and Permissivism2. In short, I argue that Levinstein’s two arguments fail to rule out any 
type of Permissivism. This result could support the following claim: we should treat 
Steadfast and at least some versions of a deference principle as viable positions in the 
discussion about several types of Permissivism, because Steadfast and the Deference 
principle used by Levinstein are compatible with any type of Permissivism.  
I will proceed as follows. In section 2, following Meacham (2014), I will suggest 
necessary and sufficient conditions for Uniqueness and clearly define three types of 
Permissivism in accordance with them. In section 3, I will explain and criticize 
Levinstein’s first argument that a tension between Permissivism and Steadfast in the face 
of epistemic peer disagreement generally leads us to moderate Conciliationism. In 
section 4, I will explain and criticize Levinstein’s second argument that, given an 
‘extremely weak version of a deference principle,’ Permissivism collapses into 
Uniqueness. In the course of criticising each of Levinstein’s arguments, I will clearly 
show how different types of permissivists respond to them in different ways. Finally, in 
section 5, I conclude with some brief remarks.  
 
2 Permissivism and Uniqueness 
As Meacham (2014: 1188) points out, Uniqueness is equivalent to the conjunction of the 
following two claims: 
 
(1) (Agent Uniqueness) For any possible agent with a total evidence E, there is only 
one permissible degree of belief function for that agent. 
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(2) (Permission Parity) The same degree of belief functions are permissible for all 
possible agents who share a total evidence E.81, 82  
 
Thus, following Meacham (2014), we can distinguish three types of Permissivism. 
 
Permissivism1: One that rejects both (1) and (2) 
Permissivism2:  One that rejects (1) but accepts (2) 
Permissivism3: One that accepts (1) but rejects (2) 
 
It is noteworthy that, according to Permissivism3 or Uniqueness, the total evidence is not 
permissive with respect to the range of rational doxastic states open to any particular 
individual, while, according to Permissivism1 or Permissivism2, some total evidence is 
permissive in that way. Thus, even though Permissivism1, Permissivism2, and 
Permissivism3 are all permissive principles, there is a crucial difference between 
Permissivism1 (or Permissivism2) and Permissivism3: Permissivism1 and Permissivism2 
appeal to the following two permissive intuitions: 
 
Permissive Intuition 1: There are evidential situations in which two different 
agents can rationally adopt different beliefs. 
                                                           
81 There could be other versions of Uniqueness (and Permissivism). For my purposes in this paper, other 
versions of Uniqueness (and Permissivism) could be allowed‒so long as there are counterparts of Agent 
Uniqueness and Permission Parity, respectively, for those versions. For recent discussions of 
Uniqueness/Permissivism, see Ballantyne and Coffman (2011); Christensen (2007); Feldman (2007); 
Kelly(2014); Meacham (2014); Schoenfield (2014); White (2005, 2014). 
 
82 For the proof of the equivalence, see Meacham (2014: 1188). 
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Permissive Intuition 2: There are evidential situations in which a particular agent 
can rationally adopt a range of different beliefs.83  
 
In contrast, Permissivism3 appeals only to Permissive Intuition 1. We turn now to 
Levinstein’s first argument against permissive rationality. 
 
3 Levinstein’s First Argument and Responses 
Each type of Permissivism denies that for any given total evidence, there is a unique 
credal state that every agent with that total evidence should have. Thus each type of 
Permissivism seems to fit Steadfast well. To illustrate, suppose that there is an evidential 
situation (say total evidence E) in which there are two permissible doxastic states, D1 and 
D2 (D1 ≠ D2), at time t1. Suppose further that two rational agents who share the total 
evidence E have D1 and D2, respectively, know about each other’s opinions, and obtain 
no new evidence between t1 and t2. In such a situation, given any type of Permissivism, it 
seems rationally permissible for them to retain their doxastic states: if Permissivism1 or 
Permissivism2 holds, without assuming any rational updating policy that conflicts with 
Permissivism1 or Permissivism2,84 it is equally rational to stick to one’s current doxastic 
state or to move to another permissible doxastic state at t2; on the other hand, if 
Permissivism3 holds, it is rationally obliged to retain one’s doxastic state at t2.85  
                                                           
83 The distinction between two permissive intuitions is from Meacham (2014: 1190). 
 
84 For instance, any conservative updating policy such as Bayesian Conditionalization is generally 
incompatible with Permissivism1 and Permissivism2. 
 
85 Here I restrict my discussion to a version of Steadfast that is motivated by permissive rationality as 
described above. Of course, there are other motivations for Steadfast. For instance, Wedgwood (2010: 238) 
asserts that one should give special treatment to her own current beliefs, experiences, memories, and 
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However, according to Levinstein, Permissivism is in tension with Steadfast. To 
examine this point, following Levinstein, let’s begin by assuming that there are two 
rational agents, called Amy and Bill. At t0, Amy knows: 
 
(1) Amy and Bill will always be perfectly rational. 
(2) At t1, Amy and Bill will have the same total evidence, which may be permissive 
toward some proposition p. 
(3) Amy will update her credences by Bayesian Conditionalization.86 
(4) At t2, Amy will learn what Bill’s t1-credence in p was. 
(5) (Steadfast) Amy won’t revise her credence in p after learning what Bill’s t1-
credence in p is. 
(6) Amy will always be truth-sensitive to p. 
 
At t0, Amy does not know: 
(7) Her own credence in p at t1. 
(8) Bill’s credence in p at t1. 
(9) What evidence they will get between t0 and t1. 
                                                           
intuitions, because they can guide her directly in a way that beliefs, experiences, memories, and intuitions 
of others cannot. Wedgwood takes such an epistemic partiality towards one’s own current mental states to 
motivate Steadfast. It is worth investigating in detail how well this sort of motivations justifies Steadfast, 
but that would go beyond the scope of this paper.  
 
86 Note that, after t0, (2) and (3) are compatible only on the assumption of Permissivism3: When an agent 
updates her credences by Conditionalization, the agent’s prior credences and her new evidence suffice to 
determine a uniquely rational credence for the agent at a relevant time. Since Levinstein already assumes 
that a particular version of Permissivism holds after the initial (prior) time without providing any specific 
reason, to anyone who endorses Permissivism1 or Permissivism2, Levinstein’s argument may be already 
question begging. However, let’s set aside this issue for now. 
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Let At, Bt, at(p), and bt(p) be Amy’s time-slice, Bill’s time-slice, Amy’s credence in p at 
t, and Bill’s credence in p at t, respectively. Then we can lay out Levinstein’s argument 
for the incompatibility of Permissivism with Steadfast as follows:  
 
Levinstein’s First Argument for the Incompatibility of Permissivism with Steadfast 
P1) For all x, a0(p|a1(p) = x) = x. (by Reflection principle) 
C1) For all x and y, a0(p|a1(p) = x, b1(p) = y) = x. (from P1 and (5))  
C2) For all x and y, a0(p|a1(p) = x, b1(p) ≠ y) = x.  (from P1 and (5))  
C3) For all x and y, a0(p|b1(p) = y, a1(p) = x) = a0(p|b1(p) ≠ y, a1(p) = x).  
(from C1 and C2) 
C4) For all x and y, a0(b1(p) = y|p, a1(p) = x) = a0(b1(p) = y|~p, a1(p) = x).  
(from C3) 
P2) For some x and y, a0(a1(p) = x|p, b1(p) = y) ≠ a0(a1(p) = x|~p, b1(p) = y).  
(from (3) and (5)) 
C5) Therefore, from A0’s epistemic perspective, there is a strong asymmetry 
between a1(p) and b1(p). (from C4 and P2) 
 
P1 follows by the Reflection principle from van Fraassen (1984), according to which, 
one’s current self should epistemically defer to one’s future self87: For any x, when A0 
                                                           
87 Why does Levinstein take the Reflection principle for granted here? Levinstein assumes that (3) Amy 
will update her credences by Bayesian Conditionalization, and seems to take it for granted that Bayesian 
Conditionalization implies the Reflection principle. But it is at least not uncontroversial whether Bayesian 
Conditionalization implies the Reflection principle. For instance, see Weisberg (2007) and Park (2012). 
However, let’s set aside this issue for now.   
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thinks that she may come to have credence x in p at t1 (i.e., a0(a1(p) = x) > 0), according 
to this version of the Reflection principle, her current credence in p should be constrained 
in a way that P1 describes. Since A0 knows that her credence in p will remain the same 
whatever B1’s credence in p turns out to be, C1, C2, and C3 immediately follow. We can 
derive C4 from C3 by probability calculus88 and finally, since A0 knows that she will 
always be truth-sensitive to p, P2 follows. 
In order to better understand what C5 says, following Levinstein (pp. 7-9), let us 
define basic (in)sensitivity and conditional (in)sensitivity to whether p. Let an agent S at 
ti, Si, be basically sensitive to whether p according to a credence function c if “[c] thinks 
[Si]’s doxastic behavior will vary in some minimally predictable way or other depending 
on whether p.”89 More formally,  
 
Basic Sensitivity: An agent Si is basically sensitive to whether p according to a 
credence function c if for some x, c(si(p)=x| p) ≠ c(si(p)=x| ~p). 
 
That is, if, from c‘s perspective, Si’s credence in p is an independently valuable source of 
stochastic information about whether p, c regards Si as being basically sensitive to 
whether p; otherwise, Si is basically insensitive to whether p. That is, if, from c‘s 
perspective, Si’s credence in p is not an independently valuable source of stochastic 
                                                           
88 C3 says that, according to a0, p and b1(p) = y are conditionally (probabilistically) independent given a1(p) 
= x. Conditional (probabilistic) independence is symmetric. That is, for any propositions p, q, and r, and 
probability function pr, according to pr, p and q are conditionally independent given r (i.e., pr(p|q, r) = 
pr(p|~q, r)) if and only if q and r are conditionally independent given r (i.e., pr(q|p, r) = pr(q|~p, r)). Thus it 
follows from C3 that b1(p) = y and p are also conditionally independent given a1(p) = x, and that is exactly 
what C4 says. 
 
89 Levinstein (2015: 7). The brackets are mine. 
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information about whether p, c regards Si as being basically insensitive to truth values of 
p. More formally, 
Basic Insensitivity: An agent Si is basically insensitive to whether p according to a 
credence function c if for all x, c(si(p)=x| p) = c(si(p)=x| ~p).90 
 
With basic (in)sensitivity in hand, we can also define conditional (in)sensitivity. 
Let Si be conditionally sensitive to whether p given q according to a credence function c 
if c thinks Si’s credence in p will vary in some minimally predictable way or other 
depending on whether p given q. More formally,  
 
Conditional Sensitivity: An agent Si is conditionally sensitive to whether p given q 
according to a credence function c if for some x, c(si(p)=x| p, q) ≠ c(si(p)=x| ~p, q). 
 
That is, if, from c‘s perspective, Si’s credence in p is an independently valuable source of 
stochastic information about whether p given q, c regards Si as being conditionally 
sensitive to whether p given q; otherwise, Si is conditionally insensitive to truth values of 
p. That is, if, from c‘s perspective, Si’s credence in p is not an independently valuable 
source of stochastic information about whether p given q, c regards Si as being 
conditionally insensitive to whether p given q. More formally,  
 
Conditional Insensitivity: An agent Si is conditionally insensitive to whether p 
given q according to a credence function c if for all x,  
                                                           
90 Note that for all x, c(si(p)=x| p) = c(si(p)=x| ~p) is equivalent to c(p| si(p)=x) = c(p). 
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c(si(p)=x| p, q) = c(si(p)=x| ~p, q). 
 
Note that C4 says that, according to A0, B1 is conditionally insensitive to whether p given 
a1(p) = x. In contrast, P2 says that, according to A0, A1 is conditionally sensitive to 
whether p given b1(p) = y. Thus, regarding conditional sensitivity, there is a strong 
asymmetry between A1 and B1 from A0’s perspective. What does such a strong 
asymmetry between A1 and B1 stand for? From A0’s perspective, in contrast to her own 
future credence in p at t1, B1’s credence in p does not track whether p by responding the 
total evidence that he gets but tracks only A1’s credence in p, which tracks whether p by 
responding the total evidence that A1 gets.91 That is, as Levinstein points out “[f]rom a 
stochastic perspective, according to [A0], [B1]’s credence is just her credence with noise 
added.”92 To put it another way, from A0’s perspective, at least regarding p, a1(p) is 
epistemically better than b1(p). 
Permissivism seems to fit naturally with Steadfast, but, somewhat 
surprisingly,  Levinstein’s first argument shows that Steadfast implies such a strong 
asymmetry that seems conflict with Permissivism. Therefore, according to Levinstein, 
                                                           
91 To see this point more clearly, note that C4 implies that A0’s conditional credence in b1(p) = y given  
p (a0(b1 = y| p)) is determined by a0(a1(p) = xi| p) and a0(b1(p) = y| a1(p) = xi), because a0(b1(p) = y|p) =  
∑i a0(b1(p) = y|p, a1(p) = xi)⋅a0(a1(p) = xi|p) = ∑i a0(b1(p) = y|a1(p) = xi)⋅a0(a1(p) = xi|p), where xi ∈ {x| x is 
A1’s credence in p}. Here’s the proof: 
I) A0(B1(p) = y|p) = ∑i A0(B1(p) = y|p, A1(p) = xi)⋅A0(A1(p) = xi|p). (by probability calculus) 
II) A0(B1(p) = y|p) = ∑i A0(B1(p) = y|A1(p) = xi)⋅A0(A1(p) = xi|p). (from I and C4) 
In contrast, A0’s conditional credence in a1(p) = z given p (that is, a0(b1 = z| p)) is not determined by 
a0(b1(p) = xi| p) and a0(a1(p) = z| b1(p) = xi), because a0(a1(p) = z| p) = ∑i a0(a1(p) = z| p, b1(p) = xi)⋅a0(b1(p) 
= xi| p) ≠  
∑i a0(a1(p) = z| b1(p) = xi)⋅a0(b1(p) = xi| p), where xi ∈ {x| x is B1’s credence in p}.  
 
92 Levinstein (2015: 11). The brackets are mine. 
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permissivists should endorse Conciliationism (the denial of Steadfast) rather than 
Steadfast. Conciliationism can be formulated as follows:   
 
Conciliationism: For any evidence E, if two or more (equally and maximally) 
rational agents who share that total evidence E have different doxastic states, they 
cannot rationally retain their own doxastic states regardless of what other’s 
doxastic states turn out to be.93 
 
Can we take this to be against permissive rationality? Here is an argument for Uniqueness 
that one might construct from this idea. 
 
Argument against Permissivism 
L11) Permissivism is in tension with Steadfast. 
C11) Therefore, permissivists should endorse Conciliationism. (from L11) 
L12) Conciliationism collapses into Uniqueness. 
C12) Therefore, Permissivism collapses into Uniqueness. (from C11 and L12) 
 
                                                           
93 There are a number of different versions of Conciliationism. For instance, the Equal Weight View says 
that in disagreements with an epistemic peer, one should always split the difference (see Elga (2007) and 
Christensen (2007)); the Epistemic Value Maximization View says that in disagreements with an epistemic 
peer, one should always compromise by maximizing the average of the expected epistemic values that she 
and her epistemic peer give to their consensus credence function (see Moss (2011)). Here Levinstein 
assumes the moderate version of Conciliationism that is, as explained earlier in section 1, weaker than the 
Equal Weight View and Epistemic Value Maximization View: In contrast to the Equal Weight View and 
Epistemic Value Maximization View, as Levinstein points out, the moderate version does not imply that 
disagreeing epistemic peers always end up with a same credence. 
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Does this argument give us reason to accept Uniqueness? It does not, because it is 
unsound: Both L11 and L12 are false. In this section, I will focus on the former. As 
opposed to Levinstein’s first argument, it is false: any of the types of Permissivism fit 
well with Steadfast. Before addressing this point in detail, however, let us briefly 
consider L12.94  
First, in some cases, L12 is definitely false. Levinstein’s first argument hinges on 
cases in which a (maximally) rational agent recognizes that another (maximally) rational 
agent has a different opinion. As Levinstein (p.23) himself points out, however, even on 
the assumption of Conciliationism, “multiple responses to evidence could still be 
permitted so long as rational credence functions don’t know about each other.”95 Second, 
as Christensen (2014) points out, given that different kinds of epistemic virtue can 
independently apply to Permissivism and Conciliationism, respectively, even if 
(maximally) rational agents do know about each other’s opinions, Conciliationism may 
be compatible with Permissivism. For instance, it seems possible that epistemic 
rationality and accuracy can independently apply to Permissivism and Conciliationism, 
respectively.96 Thus, L12 is either false or controversial: when (maximally) rational 
                                                           
94 In contrast to L12, many philosophers seem to endorse the reverse of L12 that says Uniqueness commits 
one to Conciliationism. For instance, see Feldman (2007: 211-12); White (2005: 446). 
 
95 See also Ballantyne and Coffman (2012: 663-4) and Christensen (2009: 764) for a similar point. The 
point can also apply to Levinstein’s second argument that will be discussed in section 4. However, I agree 
with Levinstein (2015: 23) that “most permissivists want rationality to be permissive even when rational 
functions are aware of the alternative rational choices.” 
 
96 See Christensen (2014) for more details. Levinstein appears to acknowledge this possibility as well. See 
his Max & Eve case and discussions about it (pp. 24-6). 
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agents do not know about each other’s opinions, it is false; when (maximally) rational 
agents do know about each other’s opinions, it is at least controversial.97  
 
How Permissvism is Compatible with Steadfast 
As mentioned in section 2, anyone who rejects Uniqueness accepts either Permissivism1, 
Permissivism2, or Permissivism3. Let us call someone who endorses Permissivism1 (and 
similarly for Permissivism2 and Permissivism3) a permissivist1.  Now let’s first look at 
how a permissivist3 can endorse the rationality of Steadfast. 
 
Permissivism3 and Steadfast  
As already pointed out, Permissivm3 says that for some total evidence, two or more 
different agents could rationally have different credence functions that are uniquely 
permissible for each agent, respectively. Note that, according to Permissivm3, even 
though each agent is not permitted to have multiple doxastic states at a given time, 
Permissivism still holds because two or more different rational individuals are permitted 
to have different doxastic states at that time. Levinstein claims that, in a permissive 
situation, regarding conditional sensitivity, Steadfast implies a strong asymmetry between 
different credences in p, which is in tension with Permissivism. However, such a strong 
asymmetry fits well with Permissivm3. To see this, note that, in Amy and Bill’s case, 
Steadfast implies that, from A0’s epistemic perspective, a1(p) is epistemically better than 
b1(p). Thus, given a1(p) and b1(p), a1(p) is uniquely maximally rational for A0. However, 
                                                           
97 Of course, Levinstein also acknowledges this point. He provides some additional reasons for that (See p. 
15). And that is why he does not regard the first argument as a real threat to Permissivism per se. 
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what about B0? Is a1(p) also uniquely maximally rational for B0 when B0 knows he will 
not revise his credence in p at t1 given whatever A1’s credence in p will be? No, it is not. 
Steadfast implies that, from B0’s epistemic perspective, b1(p) is epistemically better than 
a1(p). Thus, given a1(p) and b1(p), b1(p) is uniquely maximally rational for B0. Therefore, 
even on the assumption that Steadfast implies such a strong asymmetry, both a1(p) and 
b1(p) could be uniquely maximally rational for A0 and B0, respectively. That is, when two 
(or more) agents know that they will retain their own credences in p regardless of what 
other’s credences in p turn out to be, Steadfast is clearly compatible with Permissivm3. 
So, as opposed to Levinstein’s argument for L11, a permissivist3 can rationally be 
steadfast.  
 
Permissivism1 (or Permissivism2) and Steadfast  
Now let’s look at how a permissivist1 and a permissivist2 can rationally be steadfast. 
Permissivm3 entails that there are (possible) evidential situations in which two different 
agents can rationally adopt different beliefs, but, according to Permissivm3, no total 
evidence is permissive with respect to the range of rational doxastic states open to any 
particular individual. In contrast to Permissivm3, Permissivism1 and Permissivism2 entail 
that there are (possible) evidential situations in which a particular agent can rationally 
adopt a range of different beliefs. However, according to Levinstein’s argument, 
Steadfast implies the strong asymmetry above, which shows that, from a particular 
agent’s epistemic perspective, regarding some proposition, there is uniquely maximally 
rational credence in that proposition for that agent. Therefore, given Steadfast, permissive 
rationality seems to be at most restricted to Permissivism3. Given Steadfast, does 
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Permissivism necessarily collapse into Permissivism3? That is, does any steadfast agent 
with awareness of another possible rational doxastic state have to think that her own 
doxastic state is superior? Not necessarily. There are some possible cases in which 
Permissivism1 (or Permissivism2) fits well with Steadfast. Consider the following case: 
 
The Double Epistemic Life of Véronique 
Whenever there are two equally maximally rational doxastic states, the agent from 
Paris, Véronique, adopts the one that is more beneficial from a purely pragmatic 
perspective than the other. Suppose, for example, that there are two permissible 
doxastic states, D1 and D2 (D1 ≠ D2), open to Véronique, but that more cognitive 
effort would be required of Véronique to adopt D2 than would be required to 
adopt D1. She would then adopt D1 simply in order to promote her practical 
interest in energy-saving.98 (And, if all permissible doxastic states are equally 
beneficial from the purely pragmatic perspective, Véronique would adopt one 
randomly.) 
In Prague, there is Véronique’s epistemic doppelgänger, Weronika, who is 
as (epistemically) rational as Véronique is, shares total evidence with Véronique 
at every time, and adopts the same system of epistemic evaluation that Véronique 
adopts. However, whenever there are two equally (maximally) rational doxastic 
                                                           
98 That is, there is a pressure to adopt D1 from purely practical point of view. 
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states, Weronika tracks only Véronique’s doxastic state and adopts one that 
Véronique does not adopt.99  
One fine day, on Charles Bridge in Prague, Véronique meets Weronika 
and comes to realize that Weronika is her epistemic doppelgänger. At t1, 
regarding some proposition p, Véronique regards two different credences in p, x 
and y (x ≠ y), as equally rational, but she does not have any particular one at t1 and 
is not sure yet what what credence she will have at t2. And, at the same time, 
regarding the proposition p, Weronika also regards two different credences, x and 
y, as equally rational, but she does not have any particular one at t1 and is unsure 
yet what credence she will have at t2 either. Although Véronique is not aware of 
her t2-credence in p and Weronika’s t2-credence in p, she knows the following: 
 
• At t2, she will adopt one of permissible credences in p (x and y) from purely 
pragmatic considerations, and Weronika will adopt the other. 
• At t3, she won’t revise her credence in p after learning what Weronika’s t2-
credence in p was, in order to promote her practical interest in energy-saving. 
• At t2, she will always be truth-sensitive to p. 
 
Let Vi, Wi, vi, and wi be Véronique’s time-slice, Weronika’s time-slice, Véronique’s 
credence function and Weronika’s credence function at ti, respectively. (i ∈ {1, 2}.) Then 
                                                           
99 We can also regard Weronika as Véronique’s counterpart who is in a possible world where Véronique 
has x2 rather than x1. That is, Véronique can imagine herself in a counterfactual situation where she has x2 
rather than x1 and compare her doxastic states in the actual situation and in the counterfactual. 
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we can summarize Véronique’s epistemic situation as follows in a similar way that 
Levinstein proposes for his first argument: 
 
P1’’) For all x and y, v1(p|v2(p) = x) = x (by Reflection principle)  
P2’’) For all x and y, v1(p|v2(p) = x, w2(p) = y) = x (from P1’’and Steadfast)  
P3’’) For all x and y, v1(p|v2(p) = x, w2(p) ≠ y) = y  (from P1’’ and Steadfast)  
P4’’) For all x and y, v1(p|v2(p) = x, w2(p) = y) = v1(p|v2(p) = x, w2(p) ≠ y)  
(from P2’’ and P3’’) 
P5’’) For all x and y, v1(w2(p) = y|p, v2(p) = x) = v1(w2(p) = y|~p, v2(p) = x)  
(from P4’’) 
P6’’) For some x and y, v1(v2(p) = x|p, w2(p) = y) ≠ v1(v2(p) = x|~p, w2(p) = y) 
(Because we assume Véronique knows that she will be truth-sensitive to p.)  
 
According to V1 (Véronique at t1), w2(p) is conditionally insensitive to truth values of p 
given v2(p). (w2(p) tracks only v2(p).) In contrast, according to V1, v2(p) is conditionally 
sensitive to truth values of p given w2(p). Thus, regarding conditional sensitivity, there is 
a strong asymmetry between v2(p) and w2(p) from V1’s epistemic perspective. That is, 
from V1’s epistemic perspective, in contrast to v2(p), w2(p) does not track whether p by 
responding to the total evidence that W2 gets but tracks only v2(p), which tracks whether 
p by responding the total evidence that V2 gets. (And, in fact, w2(p) does track only 
Véronique’s credence in p at that time.) Then, from V1’s purely epistemic perspective, 
regarding p, is v2(p) epistemically better than w2(p)? To put it another way, from V1’s 
purely epistemic perspective, regarding p, is there a uniquely maximally rational credence 
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in p at t2? It seems not. By assumption, V1 regards two different credences in p as equally 
(epistemically) maximally rational, and, at that time, she knows that she will have one of 
them and won’t revise her credence in p after learning what Weronika’s credence in p is 
by purely practical considerations at t2. Given that there is a distinction between 
epistemic rationality and practical rationality, if V1 knows that the asymmetry of truth-
sensitivity comes only from practical considerations, v2(p) and w2(p) seem to be equally 
(epistemically) maximally rational credences in p from V1’s purely epistemic perspective. 
 As do many philosophers, I think there is a distinction between epistemic reasons 
for believing, which mainly concern truth or accuracy of beliefs as representations of the 
world’s state, and practical reasons for believing, which mainly concern practical 
interests of beliefs as ways to one’s happiness.100 The distinction may not be so clear in 
some situations.101 However, for my purpose here, all I need is that, at least in some 
cases, it is rationally permissible for an agent like Véronique to distinguish between 
epistemic rationality and practical rationality. The Double Epistemic Life of Véronique, I 
think, shows that when a particular agent already regards two or more credences in p as 
equally (epistemically) maximally rational at a given time, even if, as Levinstein points 
out, Steadfast implies the strong asymmetry of truth-sensitivity, it is still compatible with 
Permissivism1 and Permissivism2 as epistemic principles, given Steadfast and the 
asymmetry spring only from the agent’s practical considerations of credences in p. So, as 
opposed to Levinstein’s argument for L11,a permissivist1 and a permissivist2 can also 
rationally be steadfast.  
                                                           
100 For instance, see Christensen (2000: 351-2), Foley (1982: 170-1), and Joyce (1998: 445). 
 
101 For instance, see Fantl and McGrath (2009). 
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To sum up, then, even if Steadfast implies the strong asymmetry of truth-
sensitivity, any permissivist can rationally be steadfast. Thus, as opposed to Levinstein’s 
first argument for L11, Steadfast is compatible with taking any type of Permissivism 
seriously. 
 
4 Levinstein’s Second Argument and Responses 
Now let us look at what Levinstein takes to be his main argument for Uniqueness. 
Following Levinstein, let R be a set of maximally rational credence functions 
(permissible priors), and let R(E)= {r(⋅|E): r ∈ R}. For his second argument, Levinstein 
assumes the following weak version of a deference principle for permissive rationality:  
 
Weak Perm Expert (WPE): there is at least one non-maximally rational (initial) 
credence function that should defer to any maximally rational credence function. 
More formally, there is at least one credence function c such that:        
            if  (1) E is c’s total evidence102,  
     (2) c(c ∈ R(E)) = 0,  
     (3) for all credence functions r, c(r ∈ R) > 0, 
then, c(⋅|r∈R) = r(⋅|E, r ∈ R).  
 
WPE says that for some credence function c that satisfies (1), (2), and (3), if that function 
learns that r∈R, it should switch over to r after ‘letting it learn’ the total evidence E and 
                                                           
102 E does not contain any information about what is and is not in R. 
80 
 
 
 
the fact that r itself is in R.103 According to Levinstein, given WPE, Permissivism 
collapses into Uniqueness as long as permissive rationality allows updating by Bayesian 
Conditionalization. To see this, suppose that you have a credence function c that is “a 
witness to the existential claim in WPE.” Levinstein’s second argument compares the 
results of two possible sequences of learning: 
 
L21) WPE 
L22) c will be updated by Bayesian Conditionalization 
L23) (First sequence) For any r1, r2 ∈ R, if, at t1, c learns r1 ∈ R, then, by WPE, at 
t1,  
c(⋅|r1 ∈ R) = r1 (⋅|E, r1 ∈ R); if, at t2, c learns r2  ∈ R, then, by Bayesian 
Conditionalization, 
at t2, c(⋅|r1 , r2 ∈ R) = r1 (⋅|E, r1 , r2 ∈ R). 
L24) (Second sequence) For any r1, r2 ∈ R, if, at t’1, c learns r2 ∈ R, then, by WPE, 
at t’1,  
c(⋅|r2 ∈ R) = r2 (⋅|E, r2 ∈ R); if, at t’2, c learns r1  ∈ R, then, by Bayesian 
Conditionalization, at t’2, c(⋅|r2 , r1 ∈ R) = r2 (⋅|E, r2 , r1 ∈ R). 
C’) Therefore, for any r1, r2 ∈ R, r1 (⋅|E, r1 , r2 ∈ R) = r2 (⋅|E, r1 , r2 ∈ R).   
 
Note that c(⋅|r1 , r2 ∈ R) = c(⋅|r2 , r1 ∈ R) holds because Bayesian Conditionalization treats 
evidence as commutative: From same priors, Bayesian Conditionalization gives the same 
                                                           
103 Why does r need to know that it itself is in R? Elga (2013) provides some problematic cases in which 
the ideally rational credence function may not know that it is ideally rational. See also Levinstein (2015: 
17-8) for a similar point.  
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final results even if the order of the new credences (ct1(r1∈R) =1; ct2(r2∈R) =1)) that 
represent the direct impact of new evidence at relevant time is changed in reverse order 
(ct’1(r2∈R) =1; ct’2(r1∈R) =1)). 
Does this argument succeed in showing that Permissivism collapses into 
Uniqueness? It does not. It is noteworthy that the two sequences clearly show that the 
second argument also hinges on cases in which rational agents know about each other: In 
the first sequence, at t2, r1 learns r2  ∈ R with certainty; in the second sequence, at t2, 
r2  learns r1  ∈ R with certainty. Thus premises L23 and L24 involve a lot: r1 and r2 know 
not only that which credence function the other one is, but also that each is maximally 
rational. As already pointed out in section 3, however, “multiple responses to evidence 
could still be permitted so long as rational credence functions don’t know about each 
other.”  
However, I agree with Levinstein that “most permissivists want rationality to be 
permissive even when rational functions are aware of the alternative rational choices.” 
But, I will further show that, even if we restrict our discussion to cases in which rational 
agents know about each other, Levinstein’s second argument also fails to provide any 
permissivist with a reason to adopt Uniqueness. To see this, let’s first consider a 
permissivist3’s response to the second argument.104  
 
                                                           
104 Levinstein himself also provides and considers what he calls “permissivist’s best hope for escape” from 
his second argument: “There’s an important evidential difference between rational priors considered as 
abstract objects and rational priors realized in a particular agent’s cognitive architecture.” (p. 3) Even 
though it seems to be an interesting idea, it is unclear how it works and why Levinstein takes it as 
“permissivist’s best hope for escape”. Here and below, I provide other permissivist’ss hope for escape, 
which, at least in some respects, may be better than Levinstein’s response. 
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Permissivist3’s Response to the Second Argument 
Note that all Levinstein’s second argument shows is that, given WPE and Bayesian 
Conditionalization, your permissible credence functions (that are members of your R) 
collapse into one that is uniquely permissible for you. Now suppose that there is another 
agent, Daisy, represented by credence function d (c ≠ d), which is also “a witness to the 
existential claim in WPE.” Suppose further that Daisy shares the total evidence E with 
you, and also updates her credences by Bayesian Conditionalization. Let R’ be the set of 
rational credence functions for Daisy. Then, it follows that, for any r3, r4∈R’,  
r3 (⋅|E, r3, r4 ∈ R’) = r4 (⋅|E, r3 , r4 ∈ R’) in a same way as above. Given R=R’, WPE, and 
Bayesian Conditionalization, Uniqueness appears to follow. But why should R=R’ hold? 
If the same set of rational credence functions is permissible for all rational agents who 
share total evidence E105, R=R’ would hold. However, why should we accept that? 
Levinstein provides no reason. Of course, even if R ≠ R’, when R and R’ are not disjoint, 
WPE and Bayesian Conditionalization might still imply Uniqueness. However, if R and 
R’ are disjoint, WPE and Bayesian Conditionalization clearly imply Permissivism3 rather 
than Uniqueness. That is, when R and R’ are disjoint, for some distinct  r1, r2 ∈ R, and  r3, 
r4 ∈ R’, we can have:  
 
r1 (⋅|E, r1, r2 ∈ R) = r2 (⋅|E, r1, r2 ∈ R) ≠ r3 (⋅|E, r3, r4 ∈ R’) = r4 (⋅|E, r3, r4 ∈ R’).  
 
                                                           
105 This is similar with what Meacham (2014) calls Permission Parity.  
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Is there any epistemic reason for R and R’ not to be disjoint? Levinstein provides no 
reason for that either. Thus Levinstein’s second argument fails to provide a permissvist3 a 
reason to adopt Uniqueness.  
 Note that this response still implies that, even though there are evidential 
situations in which two different individuals can rationally adopt different beliefs, no total 
evidence is permissive with respect to the range of rational doxastic states open to any 
particular individual. Thus, among various types of permissivists, only a permissvist3 can 
embrace this strategy. So does Levinstein’s second argument show that permissive 
rationality is at most restricted to Permissivism3?; does permissive rationality collapse 
into Permissivism3? It does not. I will now argue that the second argument also fails to 
provide either a permissvist1 or a permissvist2 with reason to adopt Uniqueness.  
 
Permissivist1 (or Permissivist2)’s Response to the Second Argument 
As pointed out, Levinstein’s second argument assumes that a rational updating rule is 
formally commutative: From same priors, rational updating rules give the same final 
results even if the order of the new credences that represent the direct impact of learning 
experience at relevant time is changed in reverse order. Since, in his second argument, 
Levinstein assumes that the agent updates her credences by Bayesian Conditionalization, 
formal commutativity should hold. However, I think, there are some permissible cases in 
which formally non-commutative updating rules do not reveal an epistemic defect in 
those rules. And, given such cases, the conclusion of the second argument does not 
follow from WPE and permissive rationality. For instance, as well known, Jeffrey 
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Conditionalization is formally non-commutative106, and so, in some situations, from same 
priors, Jeffrey Conditionalization yields different outcomes if the order of one’s new 
credences is changed. And we can easily prove that if updating by Jeffrey 
Conditionalization is rationally permissible for an agent, Permissivism1 and 
Permissivism2 do not collapse given WPE (see appendix A). 
Some may doubt that Jeffrey Conditionalization is a rationally permissible 
updating rule, but it is very widely accepted, and Levinstein provides no reasons for 
rejecting its rationality, or the rationality of any other formally noncommutative updating 
rule. Since Levinstein leaves open the possibility of such a case, his second argument is 
largely inconclusive. 
Permissvism1 and Permissvism2 appeal to a permissive intuition that there are 
evidential situations in which a particular individual can rationally adopt a range of 
different beliefs. Some possible evidential situations, I think, indeed have such a 
permissive intuitive force. But I do not have the space here to go into that. For now, my 
conclusion is just this: Levinstein’s WPE, on its own, does not tell against Permissvism1 
and Permissvism2. 
To sum up, then, contrary to Levinstein’s second argument, given WPE, 
Permissivism does not collapse into Uniqueness: WPE and Bayesian Conditionalization 
is compatible with Permissivism3; Moreover, as long as some formally non-commutative 
updating rules are rationally permissible, at least to some particular agents, WPE leaves 
the open possibility for Permissivism1 and Permissivism2.  
 
                                                           
106 For instance, see Jeffrey (1983: 182-3); Döring (1999); Lange (2000). 
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5 Conclusion 
In this paper, I have not intended to provide a conclusive argument for Permissivism. My 
purpose here is to show that, contrary to Levinstein’s two arguments, even on the 
assumptions of Steadfast and of the Deference principle used by Levinstein (WPE), it is 
still permissible to adopt any type of Permissivism. This result could support the 
following claim: we should treat Steadfast and at least some versions of a deference 
principle as viable positions in the discussion about several types of Permissivism, 
because they are compatible with any type of Permissivism. Levinstein’s first argument 
and a permissivist3’s response to it shows that, even when Steadfast springs from a 
rational agent’s (purely) epistemic considerations of doxastic states, Steadfast is still 
compatible with Permissivism3. Levinstein’s first argument and a permissivist1 (or a 
permissivist2)’s response to it (The Double Epistemic Life of Véronique) show that, when 
Steadfast springs from a rational agent’s purely practical considerations of doxastic 
states, it fits well with Permissivism1 or Permissivism2. Levinstein’s second argument and 
a permissivist3’s response to it show that, when a rational agent updates her credences by 
formally commutative updating rules such as Bayesian Conditionalization, depending on 
whether there are disjoint sets of rationally permissible credence functions, WPE entails 
Uniqueness or Permissivism3. Levinstein’s second argument and a permissivist1 (or a 
permissivist2)’s response to it show that, as long as some formally noncommutative 
updating rules are rationally permissible, WPE is still compatible with Permissivism1 and 
Permissivism2.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
In this dissertation, I have not intended to provide a conclusive argument for permissive 
rationality or impermissive rationality. My purpose here is to show how various epistemic 
norms relate to permissive rationality or impermissive rationality. Chapter 2 shows that, 
on the assumption of Epistemic Impartiality, Conservatism is equivalent to Uniqueness. 
Chapter 3 shows how Strict/Non-Strict Immodesty and Expected Epistemic Utility 
Maximization logically relate to Permissivism and Uniqueness. Chapter 4 shows that we 
should treat Steadfastness and at least some versions of a deference principle as viable 
positions in the discussion about several types of Permissivism, because they are 
compatible with any type of Permissivism.  
 I conclude with four open questions that I leave for future research. 
(1) Is there a compelling epistemic reason for Conservatism? In particular, when 
expected accuracy is the only thing that matters to epistemic utility, does accuracy 
justify Conservatism?  
(2) Does Evidentialism (Conee & Feldman) or Williamson’s Evidence = Knowledge 
thesis justify Epistemic Impartiality? 
(3) Given that you and I are equally rational epistemic agents, how should we 
respond to cases of epistemic peer disagreement where we share the same total 
evidence but have different opinions? Many recent discussions on epistemic peer 
disagreement assume only precise credences. In particular, according to the Equal 
Weight View (EWV), we should respond to epistemic disagreement by splitting 
the difference in our credences. Given that our prior opinions are precise, EWV 
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implies that we should always have the same precise credence, as a rational 
response to epistemic disagreement, by giving our opinions an equal weight. Does 
this view adequately represent the ignorance that is present in a given situation? 
What about an alternative view that I call the Equal Ignorance View (EIV)? 
According to EIV, disagreeing epistemic peers should be understood as having 
the same imprecise credence, which can be represented by a set of prior precise 
credences. When we compare EIV with EWV, which one provides a better 
response to epistemic peer disagreement? 
(4) How does the debate over imprecise credences relate to the debate over 
Permissivism/Uniqueness? Can imprecise credences support the claim that there 
is a uniquely rational prior? 
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APPENDIX A 
JEFFREY CONDITIONALIZATION, WPE, AND PERMISSIVISM 
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To prove that if updating by Jeffrey Conditionalization is rationally permissible for an 
agent, Permissivism1 and Permissivism2 do not collapse given WPE, suppose an agent, 
called Yelena, updates her credences by Jeffrey Conditionalization rather than by 
Bayesian Conditionalization. As Levinstein (p.10) himself points out for his second 
argument, all we need to assume for Jeffrey Conditionalization is that updating by Jeffrey 
Conditionalization is rationally permissible for an agent like Yelena. Let r be one of 
members of the set of rational credence functions (R). In order to show that, given WPE, 
Permissivism1 (or Permissivism2) does not collapse into Uniqueness or Permissivism3, it 
is enough to focus on r. For the sake of argument, I will assume in what follows that a 
rational agent can learn r∈R with uncertainty. We shall now compare the following two 
updating sequences regarding r∈R:  
 
The first sequence: 
At t0: y0(r∈R) = y0(r∉R) = 0.5 
↓ --- learning experience i (y1(r∈R) = 0.97 and y1(r∉R) = 0.03 represent 
the direct effect of it) 
At t1: y1(r∈R) = 0.97; y1(r∉R) = 0.03 
                       ↓ --- learning experience ii (y2(r∈R) = 0.95 and y2(r∉R) = 0.05 represent 
the direct effect of it) 
At t2: y2(r∈R) = 0.95; y2(r∉R) = 0.05 
 
The second sequence: 
At t’0: y0(r∈R) = y0(r∉R) = 0.5 
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                         ↓ ---  learning experience i’ (y1(r∈R) = 0.95 and y1(r∉R) = 0.05 represent 
the direct effect of it) 
At t’1: y1(r∈R) = 0.95;  y1(r∉R) = 0.05 
                         ↓ ---  learning experience ii’ (y2(r∈R) = 0.97 and y2(r∉R) = 0.03 represent 
the direct effect of it) 
At t’2: y2(r∈R) = 0.97; y2(r∉R) = 0.03 
(where yi is Yelena’s credence function at ti.) 
 
In the first sequence, Yelena’s credence in r∈R and credence in r∉R are first directly 
updated to be 0.97 and 0.03, respectively, and then they are directly updated to be 0.95 
and 0.05, respectively; in the second sequence, she directly changes them in reverse 
order.  
Note that, in the first sequence, Yelena’s new credence function at t2 is  
 
(I) y2(⋅) = y0(⋅| r∈R)⋅y2(r∈R) + y0(⋅| r∉R)⋅y2(r∉R) = y0(⋅| r∈R)⋅(0.95) +  
y0(⋅| r∉R)⋅(0.05)  
(By Jeffrey Conditionalization) 
 
Let y0 be“a witness to the existential claim in WPE.” Then, given WPE, Yelena’s 
credence function at t2 is 
 
(II) y2(⋅) = r(⋅|E, r∈R)⋅(0.95) + y0(⋅| r∉R)⋅(0.05) 
 
In the second sequence, Yelena’s new credence function at t’2 is  
 
 (I’) y2(⋅) = y0(⋅| r∈R)⋅y2(r∈R) + y0(⋅| r∉R)⋅y2(r∉R) = y0(⋅| r∈R)⋅(0.97) +  
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      y0(⋅| r∉R)⋅(0.03) 
(By Jeffrey Conditionalization) 
 
Then, given WPE, Yelena’s credence function at t’2 is 
 
(II’) y2(⋅) = r(⋅|E, r∈R)⋅(0.97) + y0(⋅| r∉R)⋅(0.03) 
 
(II) and (II’) are clearly different. As long as updating by Jeffrey Conditionalization is 
rationally permissible, at least to agents like Y0 (Yelena at t0), WPE does not rule out the 
possibility that Permissvism1 (or Permissvism2) are rational epistemic principles: WPE 
does not prevent Y0 from a permissive case where Permissvism1 (or Permissvism2) holds. 
